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Negating the Cost of “I Do”: Ending the United States
Tax Code’s Family Penalty Through Permissive Joint
Filing
Christine D. Allie*
In June 2016, Republicans in the House of Representatives announced
their vision for a simplified tax code built for economic growth in a 35
page policy paper released as part of a six part series.1 In November 2016,
Republican Donald Trump was elected as the 45th President of the United
States, which, along with the elections of a Republican-controlled House
and Senate, allowed for significant changes to the United States’ tax
structure to become law on December 22, 2017.2 Though Congress purports
to strive for simplicity, support for families, fairness, and progressivity,
these changes fell short of meaningful progress in moving toward these
goals. This Article argues that such fairness and support for families may
only be expressed through a code that eliminates the family tax penalty
created by application of the Head of Households filing status and the
mandated filing status based on marriage. To support the family, the tax
code must end its use of marital status as a measure of economic
circumstances where it penalizes the family.

Copyright 2017, by CHRISTINE D. ALLIE.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Delaware Law School. I am grateful for my
husband, Stuart, and newborn daughter, Clare Rose (July 14, 2016), who have
inspired this paper. Thanks also to the 2017 Junior Tax Workshop participants
and the Honorable Aida Wasserstein for comments on earlier drafts.
1. “A Better Way” is a series of six policy papers on Poverty, National
Security, The Economy, The Constitution, Health Care, and Tax Reform available
at the Speaker of the U.S. House of Representative’s website https://abetterway
.speaker.gov/, which are presented as the GOP’s vision for a confident America,
at home and abroad. See A Better Way, SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, https://abetterway.speaker.gov/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/Q443-LZHH]. The introduction of a new tax code has been a
persistent initiative for recent Congresses, with Congressmen regularly citing its
complexity, having grown from 26,000 pages in 1986 to about 70,000 pages today.
2. Donald Trump secured 304 electoral votes to Hilary Clinton’s 227, with
270 electoral votes needed to win. The 2016 General Election formed a 115th
United States Congress with 52 Republican senators, out of 100 total senators,
and 241 Republican Representatives in the U.S. House of Representatives, out of
435 total Representatives, with 218 seats needed for control. FEDERAL ELECTIONS
2016, FED. ELECTION COMM’N (Dec. 2017). The changes to the tax structure were
enacted as Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017).
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INTRODUCTION
That ubiquitous and seemingly amiable query of “what do you do?”
when encountering new acquaintances tends to lead to an awkward
moment for many tax practitioners. Upon divulging their field,
accountants and tax attorneys likely are responded to with stiff smiles lined
with a smidge of pity; though, those persons called to the profession know
that they work in a dynamic area of practice that should be met with envy
rather than pity. The study of a nation’s tax system is quite remarkable in
considering that nation’s values—where that system places the burden of
taxation indicates who it believes should contribute financially to the wellbeing of the nation. Conversely, when a party receives a tax deduction or
a tax credit3 for certain expenditures or actions, the country is indicating
its support for those expenditures or actions. Through the tax code, the
American citizenry purports to support children, home ownership,
environmentally friendly initiatives, health insurance, and much more.4
3. Tax credits provide a dollar-for-dollar reduction of a taxpayer’s income tax
liability. In other words, a $100 tax credit reduces the taxpayer’s tax liability by
$100. On the other hand, tax deductions reduce a taxpayer’s taxable income and, as
a result, only reduce the taxpayer’s tax liability by an amount equal to the amount
of the tax deduction, multiplied by the taxpayer’s marginal tax rate. Thus, a $100
tax deduction reduces the income of a taxpayer in the 25% marginal tax bracket by
$25. These examples illustrate two points. First, a tax credit always is worth more
than a dollar-equivalent tax deduction because the deduction reduces the tax liability
by only a percent of the deduction amount, unless the taxpayer is subject to a 100%
marginal tax rate. Second, the benefit provided by a tax deduction increases as the
taxpayer’s marginal tax rate increases; the tax benefit associated with a tax credit
does not. For example, a taxpayer in the 25% marginal tax bracket receives a $25
tax benefit—that is, reduction in tax liability—from a $100 tax deduction, while a
taxpayer in a 33% tax bracket receives a $33 tax benefit from the same deduction.
Axiomatically, those taxpayers who earn more benefit more from an identical tax
deduction. See, e.g., Alvin C. Warren, Jr., The Relationship between a Credit and a
Deduction for the Foreign Taxes of a Multinational Corporation (Harvard Pub.
Law, Working Paper No. 14-23, 2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2442306 [https://perma.cc/ED92-WT92].
4. Children and childcare are supported through myriad Internal Revenue
Code provisions including the exemption for expenses for dependent care, § 21, the
Child Tax Credit, § 24, and dependent care assistance programs, § 129. Home
ownership is subsidized through the Qualified Residence Mortgage Interest
Deduction, § 163(h)(3). Green initiatives are supported by the energy credit, § 48, a
credit for nonbusiness energy property expenditures, § 25C, and the Residential
Energy Efficient Property Credit, § 25D. Health insurance is supported by the
exclusion of the value of such insurance provided by an employer to an employee
from the employee’s gross income under § 106, as well as through the refundable
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Keeping these national values in mind, deductions and credits that
provide greater value to an unmarried couple than to a dual income,
wedded pair earning the same amount are tough to reconcile. There is an
inherent conflict with state-mandated filing statuses5 and phase-outs6 that
credit for coverage under a qualified health plan, § 36B. See I.R.C. §§ 21, 24, 25C,
25D, 36B, 48, 106, 129, 163(h)(3) (2012).
5. A taxpayer’s “filing status” is the mechanism that the Internal Revenue
Code uses to determine a taxpayer’s filing requirements, standard deduction,
eligibility for certain credits and deductions, and, ultimately, tax liability, by
determining which tax rate schedule the taxpayer must use. There are five filing
statuses: (1) Single; (2) Married Filing Jointly; (3) Married Filing Separately; (4)
Head of Household; and (5) Qualifying Widow(er) with Dependent Child. See IRS
Tax Tip 2011-09, TAXING SUBJECTS (Jan. 13, 2011), https://taxingsubjects.com/ourblog/taxnews/irs-tax-tip-2011-09/ [https://perma.cc/96UF-5TQZ]. A taxpayer’s
filing status results from the taxpayer’s marital status and family situation, that is,
whether or not the taxpayer has dependents. Id; see also IRS, PUBLICATION 501,
EXEMPTIONS, STANDARD DEDUCTION, AND FILING INFORMATION 6 (2015),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p501--2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/UCC9-ABWE].
6. A “phase-out” refers to a situation in the tax code in which the value of a
tax benefit—a deduction or credit—is reduced as the taxpayer’s income rises.
Phase-outs occur because of congressional preferences to target tax benefits
towards middle and lower-income households and, additionally, to limit the loss
of revenue resulting from the tax deduction or credit. Phase-outs reduce tax
benefits at different rates depending on the particular code provision to which they
relate. Many phase-out provisions reduce the underlying benefit—the deduction
or credit—at a constant rate over an income range. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 25 (providing
for a reduction of the American Opportunity Tax Credit ratably over a $10,000
range); see also id. § 23 (reducing the adoption tax credit over a $40,000 income
range). Some phase-outs, however, reduce the underlying tax benefit by a
specified amount for each fixed increment of income. See, e.g., § 24 (decreasing
the amount of the child tax credit available to a taxpayer by $50 for each $1,000,
or part thereof, of income above the phase-out threshold). Phase-outs with this
characteristic reduce the underlying tax benefit by the same amount—in the case
of the child tax credit, by $50—regardless of whether the taxpayer just crosses the
offending threshold or significantly exceeds that threshold. Thus, despite
exceeding the threshold for the child tax credit by a single dollar, a taxpayer will
see the credit reduced by $50—the same result that would have occurred if the
threshold had been exceeded by $999. Phase-outs not only reduce tax benefits
received by higher income taxpayers—they also increase these taxpayers’
effective marginal tax rates. See CONG. BUDGET OFF., EFFECTIVE MARGINAL T AX
RATES FOR LOW AND MODERATE INCOME WORKERS (Nov. 2012); see also
MICHAEL SCHUYLER, INST. FOR REAS. ON THE ECON. OF TAX’N, ECONOMIC
POLICY BULLETIN NO. 83, PHASE-OUTS INCREASE TAX RATES AND TAX
COMPLEXITY (Mar. 2001); Robert J. Peroni, Reform in the Use of Phase-Outs and
Floors in the Individual Income Tax System, 91 TAX NOTES 1415 (Supp. May 28,
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penalize the traditional family unit, blessed by the state’s seal of
matrimony, in favor of similarly situated families that eschew such
government constructs. The tax system is one of progressive rates,7 formed
from values of horizontal and vertical equity,8 and consists of numerous
tax provisions that purportedly aim to reduce the overall tax liability for
those caring for dependents.9 Although most of those provisions were
premised on the intention of supporting the family, Congress’s recognition
that unmarried persons form bonds and maintain responsibility for
dependents has led to changes to the tax code. These changes have had the
unintended consequence of potentially penalizing dual income-earning
couples with kids (“DWIKs”) through higher tax liabilities.10

2001); Alan D. Viard, The Basic Economics of Pease and PEP, 146 TAX NOTES
805 (Feb. 9, 2015).
7. A progressive tax structure is one in which an individual or family’s tax
rate increases as income increases. The United States federal income tax law
achieves progressivity through the use of tax rate tables that divide a taxpayer’s
income into different brackets. As the taxpayer’s income rises into a higher tax
bracket, the portion of income that falls into that bracket is taxed at the higher
rate, with the remaining amount taxed in the lower tax bracket(s). See I.R.C. § 1.
8. The principle of “horizontal equity” refers to the notion that similarly
situated individuals should be taxed similarly. “Vertical equity” refers to the idea
that the greater the taxpayer’s means as measured by income, the greater the share
of the overall income tax burden the taxpayer should bear. See generally David
Elkins, Horizontal Equity as a Principle of Tax Theory, 24 YALE LAW & POL’Y
REV. 43 (2006); Henry Ordower, Horizontal and Vertical Equity in Taxation as
Constitutional Principles: Germany and the United States Contrasted, 7 FLA. TAX
REV. 259 (2006); Horizontal Equity, WG&L TAX DICTIONARY (2014); Vertical
Equity, WG&L TAX DICTIONARY (2014).
9. See, e.g., the Child and Dependent Care Credit, § 21; Child Tax Credit, § 24;
Hope and Lifetime Learning Credits, § 25A; Dependent Exemptions, § 151(b)–(c).
10. As used herein, the term “DWIK” refers to a dual income-earning married
couple with kids. See Life Style Acronyms, EUREKA: THE 21ST-CENTURY GUIDE
TO KNOWLEDGE, http://www.eurekaencyclopedia.com/index.php/Category:LifeStyle_Acronyms (last visited Sept. 29, 2017) [https://perma.cc/NNF6-HNJZ].
It has long been recognized that
[m]arriage complicates the design of a fair and progressive income tax.
Once it acknowledges marriage, a tax regime must determine whether to
treat the married couple as a taxpaying unit or whether each individual
spouse must pay taxes separately. A fair tax system should include
marriage neutrality, income pooling, and progressive tax rates;
unfortunately, as Professor Boris Bittker famously illustrated, these
principles conflict with each other, so, in designing a marriage tax,
Congress cannot achieve all three goals.
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The nation’s tax laws have gone through numerous changes since the
early twentieth century’s conception of the income tax, which was
assessed originally per individual—adding the filing statuses of Married
Individuals Filing Joint Returns in 194811 and Heads of Households in
195112 to ameliorate certain perceived inequities. Social construction and
customs regarding marriage and, particularly, the states’ definitions of
marriage in the United States, however, have gone through profound
adjustments in the years since the conception of such filing statuses.
Therefore, it is vital to reconsider whether the consequences of a
mandatory “married” filing status—whether filing jointly or separately—
reflects current policy goals and societal values.
This Article examines the current role of the mandatory married filing
status as a family penalty—specifically to DWIKs—present in the tax
code. This Article considers the rationale of the current system through its
development and whether its original goals have resulted in changed
consequences in which the state’s “marriage” status potentially becomes
discretionary for many taxpayers.13 The Article concludes with the
determination that developments in marriage mandate that a married filing

Samuel D. Brunson, Taxing Polygamy, 91 WASH. U.L. REV. 113, 118 n.21 (2013)
(citing Samuel D. Brunson, Grown-Up Income Shifting: Yesterday’s Kiddie Tax Is
Not Enough, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 457, 468 (2011)); see also Jane M. Fraser, The
Marriage Tax, 32 MGMT. SCI. 831, 831 (1986); Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income
Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 1395–96 (1975).
11. The ability for a married couple to file a joint tax return resulted from the
enactment, over presidential veto, of the Revenue Act of 1948. Revenue Act of
1948, Pub. L. No. 80-471, 62 Stat. 110.
12. The Revenue Act of 1951 introduced the Head of Household status into the
Internal Revenue Code. Revenue Act of 1951, Pub L. No. 82-183, 65 Stat. 452.
13. Though researchers differ on their findings of whether the Earned Income
Tax Credit (“EITC”), in particular, has an effect on marriage rates, the perspective
presented herein does not turn on whether such family penalties reduce marriage
rates. Instead, the framing of this permissive joint filing conclusion is rooted in
establishing a system of taxation that addresses the equity and justice claims of
those parents espoused by the state. See C.M. Herbst, The Impact of the Earned
Income Tax Credit on Marriage and Divorce: Evidence from Flow Data, 30
POPUL. RES. POL’Y REV. 101, 124 (2011) (concluding that increases in the Earned
Income Tax Credit are associated with reductions in new marriages). But cf. Ann
L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-Based
Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV. 533, 559–64 (1995) (considering, instead,
that this potential marriage disincentive may not translate into behavior, that is,
divorce or failure to marry based on the tax outcome, due to psychological, social,
and economic factors that influence decisions to marry, as well as the taxpayers’
understanding of the terms of the program).
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status must remain permissive joint filing to achieve the horizontal equity
goals upon which the tax system is founded. This system would discard
the “Married Individuals Filing Separate Returns” filing status in favor of
allowing such individuals to use the “Unmarried Individuals” or the
“Heads of Households” filing status as an alternative to joint filing.14
Although such a fundamental change to our tax structure certainly
would raise distributive and revenue concerns as an autonomous revision,
such secondary effects must be addressed through other means, such as
higher marginal tax rates and effective anti-poverty or income redistribution
provisions. A revised version of the code must base its structure on modern
values and goals and consider efficient mechanisms to achieve those ends.
This proposal should not be studied discretely but rather as the foundation
of a fiscal system that respects and supports the individual while showing
that same respect and support to individuals who choose a conventional
family structure.
Part I of this Article examines the historical underpinnings for the
current construction of the code. In examining the purpose of its details
and the operation of its terms, this Article questions whether those
purposes are fulfilled by the application of the current code and whether
those values reflect today’s values and goals. Part II reviews the 1951 and
1969 reforms, and reactions to those reforms, which converted the code
from pro-family to a structure that penalizes marriage for those with and
without children. Part III focuses on three particular provisions that affect
tax liability by marriage or by children within and without a marriage unit
for the true effect of potential marriage and family penalties to be
confronted. Finally, Part IV concludes that adherence to mandatory
marriage status filing to achieve any version of equity is an incompetent
pursuit. Mandatory filing based on nuptials is as unacceptable as mandatory
filing devoid of the recognition of the family unit as a tax unit. To avoid this
“family penalty,” income splitting and separate filing both must be
available.
I. THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX WAS INTRODUCED AS
PRO-FAMILY AND PRO-MARRIAGE
A marriage penalty occurs when a married couple must pay more in
taxes than if each spouse filed as an unmarried taxpayer.15 A marriage
14. An individual is a head of household if she is not married at the close of
her taxable year, is not a surviving spouse, and maintains as her home a household
of a qualifying child or a qualifying dependent. I.R.C. § 2(b).
15. Richard B. Malamud, Allocation of the Joint Return Marriage Penalty
and Bonus, 15 VA. TAX REV. 489, 491 (1995-1996).
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bonus occurs when a married couple pays less in taxes by filing a joint
return.16 A married couple would be harmed by their status as married
when a dual income couple has a particularly low income and would thus
phase out, or begin to phase out, of low income credits and other antipoverty benefits that would be available to one or both spouses if he or she
filed as unmarried individuals.17 A married couple also would be harmed
by such a status when both members of the dual income couple had
substantial income, as, consequently, more of their income would be
subjected to a greater marginal rate than if they filed individually. In addition
to increased marginal rates, this married couple may face increased phaseouts of deductions and credits and also may face penalties enacted to serve
against high income individuals. As joint filing thresholds often are not
double that of unmarried income thresholds, individuals not targeted as
high income earners may become high income earners through marriage
without any change to their earnings.
A. In the Beginning, There Was Only Tax Filing Per Individual
In 1901, Guy C. Earl and his wife Ella F. Earl entered into a written
contract in which they agreed
that any property either of us now has or may hereafter receive or
acquire (of any and every kind) in any way, either by earnings
(including salaries, fees, etc.) or any rights by contract or
otherwise during the existence of our marriage, or which we or
either of us may receive by gift, bequest, devise or inheritance,
and all the proceeds, issues and profits of any and all such property
shall be treated and considered and hereby is declared to be
16. Id.
17. See Robert Cherry, Improving Efficiency and Equity of Child-Related
Federal Tax Policies, 27 E. ECON. J. 309, 309–10 (2001), for a discussion of the
marriage penalty’s very high marginal effect faced by poor female household
heads when, once married, they lose eligibility for food stamps, housing, child
care subsidies, welfare benefits, and the reduction of the EITC and other childrelated federal tax benefits. Though many of these benefits, such as food stamps,
housing, and childcare subsidies, are welfare-based, there are also anti-poverty
benefits of the Revenue Code, such as the EITC, the Dependent Care Credit under
I.R.C. § 21, and the additional child tax credit under § 24(d), that also are reduced
or eliminated when a joint filing status increases household income over a certain
threshold that would not be implicated when the couple lives together unmarried.
See discussion infra Part III.A., for a detailed application of the Earned Income
Tax Credit that begins to phase out at about $24,000 for a married couple with
three or more children but not until about $36,000 for a similar unmarried couple.
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received, held, taken and owned by us as joint tenants and not
otherwise with the right of survivorship.18
Tax planning did not motivate this agreement between husband and wife.19
In fact, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the income tax was
unconstitutional six years prior; Congress did not reintroduce the income
tax until more than a decade after Mr. and Mrs. Earl signed this contract.20
Rather, the married couple intended this agreement to be a substitute for a
will that would pass property directly from Guy to Ella in the event of his
death—without having the property go through probate.21
In Earl v. Commissioner, the government challenged whether income
earned by Guy in 1920 and 1921 was properly disclosed by the couple
when they reported half of such amount on Guy’s income tax return and
the other half on Ella’s tax return.22 Though the Supreme Court famously
found that the entire salary must be taxed to Guy in determining that the
taxing act could “no doubt . . . tax salaries to those who earned them,” the
Earls appreciated that the application of the relevant revenue acts would
confer an expense in singularly reporting the income over the individuals
each reporting half.23
During the years in question, United States’ tax law provided for taxes
to be levied progressively—per individual—which, for the Earls, meant a
greater tax liability because Guy was required to report all of the income

18. Earl v. Comm’r, 30 F.2d 898, 898 (9th Cir. 1929), rev’g Earl v. Comm’r,
10 B.T.A. 723 (Feb. 14, 1928), rev. sub. nom. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1929).
19. See Patricia A. Cain, The Story of Earl: How Echoes (and Metaphors)
From the Past Continue to Shape the Assignment of Income Doctrine, in TAX
STORIES: AN IN-DEPTH LOOK AT TEN LEADING FEDERAL INCOME TAX CASES
275, 313–19 (Paul L. Caron ed., 2003).
20. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Tr. Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), found that the
Constitution prohibited a federal income tax. The Sixteenth Amendment, U.S.
CONST. amend. XVI, was adopted in 1913, allowing for federal income taxes. The
Revenue Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16, § 2, 38 Stat. 114, 166, was the first to
impose an income tax following the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment.
21. See Cain, supra note 19, at 313–16.
22. Earl, 10 B.T.A. at 723–24.
23. Lucas, 281 U.S. at 114. The Revenue Act of 1921, for instance, assessed
a Normal Tax of eight percent, with an allowance of four percent on the first
$4,000 reported per individual as well as a graduated income tax that would levy
Earl’s earnings with a nine percent marginal rate surtax if reported singularly and
a two percent marginal rate surtax if each reported half the income. See Revenue
Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-98, §§ 210, 211, 42 Stat. 227, 233.
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on his return.24 In the Earls’ case, the Court concluded that salaries are
taxed to those who earn them.25 In 1930, the Supreme Court applied Earl’s
holding in Poe v. Seaborn.26 The Seaborns resided in a state with
community property laws that provided that community property interests
are presently vested in the spouse—rather than vesting in the spouse at
death.27 The Seaborns filed returns on such a per individual case called for
in the applicable Revenue Act of 1926, each reporting half of the earnings
from the husband’s salary and from the other property held in the
husband’s name only.28 Here, the Supreme Court found, in contrast to the
Earls’ case, that due to state law dictating that earnings are never the
property of the spouse performing the work, but rather that of the
community, the husband and wife were entitled to file separate returns
with each spouse treating half of the community income as his or her
respective income.29 The Court concluded that although this determination
would vary the incidence and operation of the tax depending on the state’s
property laws, it was not an unconstitutional interpretation.30
24. The first income tax effective after the ratification of the Sixteenth
Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XVI, which provided that “Congress shall have
power to lay and collect taxes on incomes . . . without apportionment among the
several States . . .,” referred to a normal tax assessed on “every citizen of the United
States” and “to every person residing in the United States.” This income tax also
assessed an additional tax on “every individual.” Revenue Act of 1913 § 2. The
Revenue Act of 1921 called, simply, for both a normal tax and a surtax imposed “upon
the net income of every individual.” Revenue Act of 1921 §§ 210, 211. The language
had been the same in each act since the Revenue Act of 1919, Pub. L. No. 65-254, 40
Stat. 1057. A progressive income tax system requires that initial income is taxed at a
lower rate than subsequent income. See Harry Kalven, Jr. & Walter Blum, The Uneasy
Case for Progressive Taxation, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 417, 419 (1952).
25. Earl, 10 B.T.A. at 724–25.
26. Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
27. Id. at 113. These taxpayers were Washington state residents where the
spouse’s interest in community property is presently vested—as opposed to
California state community property law where the spouse’s interest in community
property was, at that time, an expected contingency on the spouse’s death. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 118.
30. Id. at 117–18. The Court was responding to an argument made pursuant
to U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 1, which provides that “all Duties, Imposts and
Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.” There is no lack of
uniformity, however, because differences in state law may bring a person within
or without the category designated by Congress as taxable. See U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8 cl. 1. A taxing statute does not fall short of the prescribed uniformity because
its operation and incidence may be affected by differences in state laws. Phillips
v. Comm’r, 283 U.S. 589, 602 (1931).
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The Court’s decision in Seaborn means that spouses in community
property states received the functional equivalent of income splitting
because the collective earnings of the couple were split and taxed half to
each spouse. By allowing income splitting, the Court’s decision permitted
a married couple in a community property state to receive double benefits
of a progressive income tax schedule. A married couple with only a single
income earner received a “marriage bonus” because the income earned by
a single member of the couple would be divided among two returns,
allowing more of that income to fall in the lower graduated tax brackets.
Though, when both individuals in a married couple earned similar
incomes, they were taxed similarly to unmarried individuals or married
individuals in non-community property states. The status of the law at this
time meant then that there were two forms of horizontal inequality or
violations of marriage neutrality.31 First, in community property states,
two married individuals could pay fewer taxes than two unmarried
individuals with comparable incomes because the income of the married
couple would be divided over two tax returns. Second, a married couple
in a community property state could have a lower tax liability than a
married couple in a common law property state.32
B. Introducing Income Splitting to the Tax Code
The simplest answer to the Seaborn complication would have been to
implement a legislative fix that would discard state community property
rules for federal tax purposes. The Revenue Act of 1948, however,
attempted to eliminate these inequities and create geographic uniformity
by allowing all married couples—both in common law and in community
property states—to file a joint return and pay twice the tax that a single
31. Marriage neutrality proponents argue against the treatment of married
couples as a singular unit and maintain that married and unmarried couples should
be subject to equal tax burdens. See, e.g., Yair Listokin, Taxation and Marriage:
A Reappraisal, 67 TAX LAW REV. 185 passim (2014).
32. Whether a state is a community property state is a matter of state law.
Several states have statutes that provide that each spouse has a present, vested, onehalf ownership interest in marital property. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-211(A)
(2017); CAL. FAM. CODE § 751 (West 2017); IDAHO CODE § 32-906(1) (2017); LA.
CIV. CODE art. 2336 (2017); NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.225(1) (2017); N.M. STAT ANN.
§ 40-3-12 (2017); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.002 (West 2017); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 26.16.030 (2017); WIS. STAT. § 766.31(3) (2017). In common law property states,
spouses have similar rights and interests in each other’s property at divorce or death.
For a comparison of the two regimes, see Susan Kalinka, Taxation of Community
Income: It is Time for Congress to Override Poe v. Seaborn, 58 LA. L. REV. 73, 80–
84 (1997).
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individual would pay on half of the couple's total taxable income. This
change was classified as a “tax-equalization” feature and “designed to
produce uniform treatment for residents of common law property and
community property States.”33 That statute provided that “[i]n the case of
a joint return of husband and wife . . . the combined normal tax and surtax
. . . shall be twice the combined normal tax and surtax that would be
determined if the net income and the applicable credits against net income
. . . were reduced by one-half.34” This calculation ensures that a tax is
assessed on half of the aggregate income of the married couple at the same
rate that tax is assessed on an unmarried taxpayer. That liability is doubled
so that the married taxpayer essentially is income splitting as if each
taxpayer is earning half of the income and is assessed a tax at the lower
rates available to lower income individuals. The standard deduction limit
available to joint return filers, however, remained equal to that of the
standard deduction limit available to the unmarried filer when “in the case
of a separate return by a married individual, the standard deduction shall
be [half of that limit].”35 Thus, although the income tax brackets may have
allowed for a tax equal to the amount taxed if each spouse had earned half
of the income and filed as an individual, because certain deductions were
not doubled, there continued to be a potential marriage penalty.
This 1948 change calmed what had become a rush of states to enact
community property law reforms for their married residents to have access
to the marriage bonus while making the marriage bonus more pronounced
when contrasting with unmarried persons.36 With income splitting available
33. H.R. REP. NO. 80-1274, pt.1 (1948). For an alternate tax system, consider
states in the United States utilizing only one progressive tax table that may be applied
to a married couple filing either jointly on their combined income or individually on
their separate income. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-30-2103 (2017).
34. Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-471, § 301, 62 Stat. 110, 114.
35. Id. § 302(a).
36. This excerpt from a House Report describes Congressional concerns that
led to the 1948 change in how married couples were taxed:
Recently, however, a number of States have shifted from the common
law to the community property system. In these cases, benefits under the
Federal income tax which residents of the State would obtain under the
community property system were largely responsible for the
abandonment of common law. . . . The geographical differences in the
impact of the individual income tax resulting from the fact that 12 States
use community property raises a serious problem, but the fact which
makes action at the present session imperative is the potential rapid
extension of community property to a large number of other common
law States. . . . If the necessary action is not taken, there will be a flood
of ill-advised State legislation intended to produce the same results, but
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to all married persons in the country, the focus turned to the comparative
effect on single people who paid higher income taxes than married couples
at the same income levels.37 The defense to this result was that single
persons at the time generally were not considered to maintain a household
with the attendant costs of lawn care, snow removal, mending leaky pipes,
or replacing spent appliances. Singles, instead, were thought of as a mass
of childless persons tucked away in individual rented apartments, or
rooms, either rented or within homes belonging to and maintained by his
or her relations. Thus, the income splitting allowance for married couples
was in furtherance of addressing the additional expenses of maintaining
such a household.38 When an unmarried person did maintain a household
and support dependents, however, he was at some tax disadvantage vis-àvis the married couple. An unmarried person, for instance, may have been
obliged to maintain a household with multiple dependents with attendant
costs far greater than those of a married person with only one dependent,
that is, a spouse, yet the unmarried person would not be permitted to use
the more generous income splitting available to the married couple.
II. THE 1951 AND 1969 PURPORTED HORIZONTAL EQUITY REFORMS TO
THE CODE DILUTED THE STATUS OF THE WIFE AND THE MOTHER
The 1951 and 1969 reforms attempted to recognize living situations
and their attendant costs outside of those envisioned in earlier versions of
the code.39 The introduction of the Head of Household (“HOH”) filing
status acknowledged that the costs in maintaining children and other such
dependents were not exclusive to married couples.40 The 1969 change,
which addressed the “singles penalty” then found in the code, similarly
addressed unmarried individuals but now recognized that a single
individual may maintain a household rather than renting a room or living

doing so in a manner which has most unfortunate consequences, not only
for the taxpayers involved, but also for all the persons who must use or
administer the property laws of the States which rush into the community
property system.
H.R. REP. NO. 80-1274, pt. VIII (1948).
37. See discussion infra Part II.
38. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION
OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, at 222 (J. Comm. Print. 1970) [hereinafter
GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969].
39. See Revenue Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-183, 65 Stat. 452, 480–83; Tax
Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487, 678–82.
40. See discussion infra Part.II.A.

512

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78

within a household financed by a married couple.41 Although increased tax
relief for unmarried parents and equitable recognition for bachelors and
bachelorettes choosing suburban communities over small city lodgings are
legitimate concerns, each of these new and more generous statuses not
applied to the married couple diluted the recognition of the non-working
or lower earning spouse’s non-economic contributions to the economic
income of the married unit. As the bracket for the head of household or the
unmarried, childless individual is expanded, both the non-economic
contributions of the childless spouse to the economic income as well as
the non-economic contributions of the mother lose tax bracket value visà-vis the unmarried taxpayer.
A. The 1951 Addition of the Head of Household Filing Status Introduced
the “Family Penalty”
In 1951, a HOH filing status was enacted that allowed single people
furnishing over half of the cost of maintaining a household to have
approximately half of the income splitting benefits given to married filers
as long as that household was the principal place of abode of a child,
grandchild, or any other dependent of the taxpayer.42 This filing status and
attendant tax schedule created the first instance of a penalty for married
couples when they have children, examined herein as the “family
penalty.”43 Whereas previously a married couple was entitled to such a tax
status that allowed for a doubling of tax brackets from that of their
alternate, single status, the HOH filing status provided for changed
circumstances in which the married bracket was no longer twice the
unmarried bracket when a dependent was present.44 Under this new
41. See discussion infra Part.II.B.
42. Revenue Act of 1951 § 301. The percent tax difference between head of
household and married couples ranged from 50% for lower income earners to 48.1%
for higher income earners. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON INTERNAL REV. TAX’N, 82ND
CONG., SUMMARY OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE REVENUE ACT OF 1951 AS AGREED
TO BY THE CONFEREES 6 tbl. 5 (Comm. Print 1951) [hereinafter SUMMARY OF THE
PROVISIONS OF THE REVENUE ACT OF 1951]. An individual was considered a Head
of Household if “such individual is not married . . . and maintains as his home a
household which constitutes . . . the principal place of abode, as a member of such
household,” a dependent, child, step-child, or descendent of a child where the
individual furnishes over half of the cost of maintaining the household. Revenue
Act of 1951 § 301.
43. See Revenue Act of 1951 § 301; SUMMARY OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE
REVENUE ACT OF 1951, supra note 42, at 6 tbl.5.
44. Compare Revenue Act of 1951 § 301, with Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L.
No. 80-471, § 301, 62 Stat. 110, 114 (1948).
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enactment, when two married persons are to become three, which often
follows marriage, they remain under merely the married tax brackets. 45
Yet when two unmarried people sharing a household add a dependent to
their fold, collectively they become entitled to one unmarried tax bracket
and one HOH bracket that, again, is approximately one and a half times a
single bracket.46
Increasing the bracket width for an HOH to greater than that of a single
person—or to less than half of that of a married couple—diluted the place
of the wife and mother in the family.47 Though true today, it was even
more so the case in 1951 that the wife was the secondary income earner
and primary non-economic contributor to the family.48 Without an HOH
filing status, the addition of the wife or mother to the 1951 tax return would
have allowed for income tax to be paid based on the premise that the
reported income is the earnings of two persons. This position fully
recognized the wife or mother’s contributions to the family by the work
she did in the home to allow the primary or sole income earner to bring
that economic contribution to the family. By extending half of that
recognition, as demonstrated through income splitting, to an HOH filer,

45. First comes love, then comes marriage, then comes baby in the baby
carriage. The addition of a dependent did increase dependent exemptions for both
married and HOH taxpayers through 2017; however, the 2017 tax reform act
reduced the value of those exemptions to zero beginning in tax year 2018. Pub. L.
No. 115-97, § 11041 (2017). The effects of the HOH filing status are not limited to
applicable income tax rates found in I.R.C. § 1. For instance, in 1990, the “Pease
Limitation” was added to the code. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11103, 104 Stat. 1388, 406–07. The Pease Limitation
provides for a reduction of up to 80% of itemized deductions otherwise allowable
for the taxable year for a taxpayer with an adjusted gross income (“AGI”) over a
certain “applicable amount.” Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act § 11103; see also
I.R.C. § 68 (2012). This “applicable amount” and “threshold amount” varies with
taxpayer filing status, allowing for such a reduction on itemized deductions for a
person with a Head of Household filing status with an applicable amount midway
between that applicable amount applied to a taxpayer filing as an unmarried individual
and that of a taxpayer filing a joint return. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation § 11103.
But see American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, § 101, 126 Stat.
2313, 2316–17 (2013) (extending the benefit of an increased applicable amount to the
HOH filing status in determining the applicability of the Pease Limitation some 23
years later).
46. See Revenue Act of 1951 § 301.
47. See id.; see also SUMMARY OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE REVENUE ACT OF
1951, supra note 42, at 6.
48. See infra note 181.
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the enactment of the HOH filing status has reduced that value of the wife
and mother by that same half.
To add insult to increased tax liability injury, in considering a
marriage-like living situation in which a couple shares a household and
has a child but is not considered married for tax filing purposes, the HOH
filing status is up for grabs between the two.49 Therefore, when a couple
remains unmarried they are able to shift the tax benefits of children to the
higher earning individual. Provisions like the larger tax bracket available
to the HOH filer may be applied to the spouse with the higher marginal
tax rate, thus increasing the collective benefit for the couple.50
Further, benefits that may phase out with high incomes that may not
be available to the married joint filer may remain accessible to an
unmarried pair. In the event that both the married and the unmarried couple
have the same collective income per couple, but in the unmarried
household one of the two has an income low enough to qualify for certain
credits related to children, the married couple is further penalized. This
family penalty exists as to the married family as against the unmarried
family only when both individuals in a couple are adequately employed
and earning income. When, instead, one member of the couple is earning
substantially less or nothing at all, only the married couple generally
would be able to take advantage of income splitting in order to achieve a
lower tax liability.51 Therefore, Congress’s attempt to provide horizontal
equity for the unmarried person supporting a household and its dependents
had resulted in this married family penalty and violation of the principle
of marriage neutrality.52

49. When the child has a principal place of abode with more than one
taxpayer and one taxpayer is a parent, the child shall be the qualifying child of the
taxpayer who is a parent of the individual. I.R.C. § 152(c)(4). If, however, both
parents attempt to claim the otherwise qualifying child, the child is treated as the
qualifying child of the parent with the highest adjusted gross income. §
152(c)(4)(B)(ii).
50. See id. § 1(a)–(c), and the relevant Revenue Procedure for adjusted for
inflation brackets, to compare the HOH filing status bracket coupled with an
Unmarried Individual filing status bracket with the Married Filing Jointly filing
status income tax bracket.
51. Generally, when the income division between the spouses is at least 80% /
20%, a marriage bonus may occur. This split may not be correct in the case of the
Earned Income Tax Credit. See id. § 32.
52. For an in-depth discussion on the principle of marriage neutrality, see
James M. Puckett, Rethinking Tax Priorities: Marriage Neutrality, Children, and
Contemporary Families, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1409 (2010).
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B. The 1969 Amendments Addressed the “Singles Penalty” by Adding
More Complexity to the Code
The 1948 and 1951 changes to tax filing status and the application of
tax rates were attempts first to create equity between married couples in
community property law states and married couples in common law states
and second to extend some degree of that resulting benefit to taxpayers
who supported dependents. The debate surrounding amendments made to
the code in 1969 focused instead on unmarried persons without dependents
and the comparative “singles penalty” that occurred as a result of those
earlier changes.53 In fact, the universal married income splitting allowance
created in 1948 also created a marriage bonus that was as much as 42.1%
when considering tax liability of like income earners in which one couple
is married and one couple is not.54 Generally, such a bonus occurs by
comparing a married couple wherein one spouse does not work outside the
home to an unmarried person. Though both income-earning individuals
may have the same income, the married individual’s income is subject to
income splitting where each spouse is taxed as though they have earned
half that income. When applied to the progressive income tax rate schedule,
the married income earner is able to access the lower rates for more of his
income. This system may provide a result in which the unmarried person is
paying as much as 42.1% more in income tax liability than the married
earner on the same amount of earnings.55 Though HOHs were entitled
from 1951 to a liability halfway between a single taxpayer’s liability and
a married taxpayer’s liability, the potential extreme marriage bonus served
to highlight the sizable tax penalty that resulted from remaining single
without dependents.

53. GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, supra note
38, at 222–24. The committee discussed that
[u]nder prior law, the tax rates imposed on single persons were quite
heavy relative to those imposed on married couples at the same income
level: at some income levels a single person’s tax was as much as 42.1
percent higher than the tax paid on a joint return with the same amount
of taxable income. The Congress believed that some difference between
the rate of tax paid by single persons and joint returns was appropriate to
reflect the additional living expenses of married taxpayers but that the
prior law differential of as much as 42 percent (the result of income
splitting) could not be justified on this basis.
Id. at 222.
54. Id. at 222, 224 tbl.5. This penalty was greatest at taxable incomes of
$28,000 and was reduced with taxable incomes both higher and lower. Id.
55. Id. at 222.
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In considering those individuals that fell within the unmarried taxpayer
status, it seems that earlier considerations contemplated a bachelor with
moderate expenses, as separate from a married person.56 A bachelor was
thought to be living with family or in a simple residence.57 A United States
House of Representatives proposal in the 1969 tax reform effort, however,
allowed for a rate structure that somewhat alleviated that “singles penalty”
for mature individuals—ages 35 and over—allowing them the use of the
intermediate tax rate schedule provided for individuals that had qualified as
HOHs since 1951.58 A summary report of that proposal, prepared by the
Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation and the Committee on
Finance, acknowledged that the age of 35 was arbitrary and this standard
thereby would treat considerably different economic situations the same.59
The summary also went on to concede that equity for single persons could
be achieved by ending income splitting for married persons rather than
manipulating the rate schedules for single persons to attempt to achieve
some weak version of this equality.60
In the final version of the 1969 reforms, 35 failed to signify some sort
of tax maturity and entitlement to reduced tax liability.61 Instead, the
56. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAX’N AND COMMITTEE ON
FINANCE, 91ST CONG., SUMMARY OF H.R. 13270, THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969
(AS PASSED BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES) 103 (J. Comm. Print 1969)
[hereinafter SUMMARY OF H.R. 13270, THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969]. The
committee explained:
[T]his treatment places unduly heavy tax burdens on mature single
individuals, widows and widowers. Such individuals more often than not
have to incur the expense of maintaining a household; and in any event,
it is maintained, they should receive some income splitting in order to be
treated fairly compared with married couples. Moreover, for widows and
widowers present law is said to be harsh in that it withdraws all the
benefits of income splitting after their spouse dies despite the fact that
they may continue to have relatively heavy living expenses.
Id.
57. See id.
58. Id. at 104.
59. Id.
60. Id. The subjective analysis, that is, the “weak version of this equality,” is
provided by this author and not the staffs of the listed committees, though the
report does state that repealing income splitting is a “more favorable result for the
Treasury” and that selecting an arbitrary age to receive more favorable tax
treatment will result in different economic situations receiving the same tax
treatment and similar incomes taxed differently. Id.
61. The Senate Finance Committee explained in its report that there was a basic
issue of too great a tax difference between married and single taxpayers that was not
limited to those over a certain age. The Committee also explained, however, that
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singles penalty was alleviated for the unwedded as a whole by enacting a
new rate schedule for all unmarried taxpayers.62 The final bill worked to
reduce the singles penalty so that an unmarried individual’s tax liability
would be no more than 20% above a married person’s tax liability while
also providing that the HOH benefit was repositioned to halfway between
the new unmarried liability and the married liability.63 The obvious final
element to preserve this repositioning of the potential tax liability
differential between unmarried and married individuals was to fix the
Married Filing Separately tax brackets at equal to the prior Unmarried
Individual brackets that were equal to half of the Married Filing Jointly
brackets.64 Without such a measure, the initiatives of previous reforms
would have been for naught, as with individual income tax brackets
available that were greater than half the married filing jointly brackets,
dual earning married couples and married couples in community property
states again would be able to reduce their tax liability by choosing an
individual filing over a joint filing. That possibility would result in the
perpetuation of the singles penalty.

there is good reason for preserving some tax differential between single persons and
HOHs who maintain a household for a dependent. These considerations led to the
changes found in the enacted legislation. See S. REP. NO. 91-552 (1969).
62. See id.
63. The highest singles penalty of 20% would be reached at a taxable income
of $24,000 under the new tax rate schedules provided in the 1969 Act and
decreased gradually as taxable income rises where a 10.9% tax penalty is possible
with a $200,000 taxable income; the penalty similarly decreases as taxable income
decreases with a potential 3.6% penalty possible at a taxable income of $1,000.
These ends of taxable income liability differentials are similar to the prior law—
13.1% possible singles tax penalty with taxable income of $200,000 and 3.6% at
$1,000 of taxable income. The focus and the result of the reforms were to limit the
height of the penalty, reducing its potential from 42.1% to 20%. Tax Reform Act of
1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487, 678–82; GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, supra note 38, at 222, 224 tbl.5 (Comm. Print 1970); see
also S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 260–62.
64. “[I]t is justified on the grounds that although a married couple has greater
living expenses than a single person and hence should pay less tax, the couple’s
living expenses are likely to be less than those of two single persons and therefore
the couple’s tax should be higher than that of two single persons.” Tax Reform Act
of 1969 § 803; GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, supra
note 38, at 223.
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C. Legal Challenges to the Marriage Penalty Demonstrate New Attitudes
Toward Marriage
The changes that led to the marriage and family penalties at that time
did not go without challenge. In 1975 and 1976, James O. Druker, a United
States Attorney and later a District Attorney for the state of New York,
and his wife Joan, who was employed as a computer programmer, made
constitutional challenges to the federal tax penalty that fell on two-income
married couples.65 The Drukers filed their federal income tax returns for
each year as “Married individuals filing separate returns”; they applied the
tax tables due to “Unmarried individuals,” however, in determining their
individual tax liabilities.66 They attached letters to each return explaining
that “they were applying the tax tables for single persons because they
believed that the income tax structure unfairly discriminates against
working married couples in violation of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment.”67
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit relied on
conclusions reached in similar cases that asserted an infringement on the
right to marry. The court found that the adverse effect of the marriage
penalty is “indirect” because, although it may weigh on the decision to
marry, it does not obstruct or prevent marriage, leaving the decision to the
individuals.68 The court concluded that Congress’s choice to adhere to
65. Druker v. Comm’r., 697 F.2d 46, 47 (2d Cir. 1982); see also Kellems v.
Comm’r, 58 T.C. 556 (1972), aff’d per curiam, 474 F.2d 1399 (2d Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 831 (1973); Faraco v. Comm’r, 261 F.2d 387 (4th Cir.
1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 925 (1959), for cases in which constitutional
challenges to the singles penalty were raised and uniformly rejected.
66. Druker, 697 F.2d at 48.
67. Id. Constitutional challenges to the singles penalty similarly were rejected.
See, e.g., Kellems, 58 T.C. 556 (stating the rational basis standard is satisfied by
Congress’s goals of geographic equalization of taxpayers as between community
and non-community states and the recognition of the greater financial burdens of
married persons than single persons and enacted such scheme consonant with
taxation based on the ability to pay); Faraco, 261 F.2d 387 (finding classification
of taxpayers according to marital status not unreasonable and much reason in
creating geographic equalization amongst married couples in a case where the
husband died on December 26, 1953 and widow claimed unconstitutional arbitrary
and unreasonable discrimination in preventing single persons from using the split
income device available to married persons in relation to her 1954 return).
68. The court considered Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 54 (1977), and found
the fact that marriage resulted in the termination of social security benefits to be
an “indirect” effect, leaving the ultimate decision to marry to the individual; and,
additionally, found that the law in question was not an attempt to interfere with

2017]

NEGATING THE COST OF “I DO”

519

principles of horizontal equity in taxing married couples equally was a
constitutionally valid decision and thus what the Drukers called the
marriage penalty deprived them of no constitutional right.69 Though the
Drukers attempted to challenge the negative tax treatment of marriage
directly, another couple focused their avoidance of the marriage penalty
on the Internal Revenue Code’s position that whether an individual is
married shall be made as of the close of the taxable year.70
In Boyter v. C.I.R., a couple used divorce to avoid the marriage penalty
when David and Angela Boyter’s dissolution scheme for the years 1975
and 1976 involved an end-of-the-year trip to the Caribbean for an offshore
divorce followed by remarriage to one another in the new year.71 Following
the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue’s application of the “sham
transaction doctrine,” the Boyters remained unmarried in future years to
ensure access to their preferential tax brackets.72 Similarly, in Druker,
James Druker stated at argument that having failed so far in the courts, he
and his wife also divorced to solve their tax problem.73 In each case, the
couples continued to live together after divorce; indeed, Angela Boyter
the individual’s freedom to marry. Later, in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374,
387 & n.12 (1978), the court found a Wisconsin statute that required any resident
with out-of-custody minor issue to receive court permission to marry was a direct
legal obstacle in the path of persons desiring to get married, which absolutely
prevented some from getting married.
69. Druker, 697 F.2d at 51.
70. Generally, the determination of whether an individual is married shall be
made as of the close of his taxable year, and an individual legally separated from
his spouse under a decree of divorce shall not be considered as married. I.R.C. §
7703(a) (2012).
71. Boyter v. Comm’r, 668 F.2d 1382 (4th Cir. 1981). In 1975, the couple
traveled to Haiti and secured a divorce under such law on December 8, 1975 and
then remarried in Maryland on January 9, 1976. In November of 1976, the Boyters
travelled to the Dominican Republic and obtained a divorce decree on November
22, 1976 and remarried in Maryland on February 10, 1977. Rev. Rul. 76-255,
1976-2 C.B. 40.
72. The sham transaction argument was not addressed by the lower court. See
Boyter, 74 T.C. at 993 & n.4. That court instead concluded that Maryland would
not recognize the foreign divorces as valid because the foreign courts lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over the divorce proceedings and, for that reason, did
not reach the Boyters’ other arguments. See id. In contrast, the appellate court
found that the sham transaction doctrine could be applied to married taxpayers
who divorced solely to avoid the marriage penalty and the tax laws and then
remarry and remanded the case to the Tax Court to determine whether the divorces
were shams and should be disregarded for federal income tax purposes. Boyter,
668 F.2d at 1387–88.
73. Druker, 697 F.2d at 50.
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testified that she did not intend to separate physically from David and that
they would continue to live together, share finances, and that the “sole
reason for her obtaining the divorce was ‘because the tax laws . . . caused
[them] to pay a penalty for being married.’”74 The sentiment and
conclusions in these lower court decisions were similarly reflected in a
contemporaneous Supreme Court decision.
In Califano v. Jobst, the United States Supreme Court in 1977
explained that “[b]oth tradition and common experience support the
conclusion that marriage is an event which marks an important change in
economic status.”75 These changes historically have focused on the premise
that a married couple would be able to reduce living expenses through
cohabitation and the untaxed imputed income of the household chores of the
wife.76 The 1951 legislative remarks in implementing the HOH filing status
and the 1977 remarks by the Supreme Court in Jobst indicate a conception
of marriage as indicative of a shared household and resources and, also,
where those who are unmarried do not share a household or resources.77
Although such a perception may have been well-founded and generally
applicable in the 50s through the 70s, it is certainly less so today.78 If
marriage is no longer a dependable indicator of economic status, the ability
to manipulate filing status, and therefore the attendant benefits and
penalties, has the result of inherent horizontal inequity in the filing status
itself.
D. The Limited Reintroduction of Income Splitting
Following a short flirtation with a secondary earner deduction
introduced in the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 and repealed by
the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Congress settled on structural changes to
74. Id.; see also Boyter, 668 F.2d at 1384 n.2.
75. Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 53 (1977).
76. GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, supra note
38, at 222. See Lawrence Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, 67 S. CAL. L.
REV. 339, 362–63 (1994), for a discussion of untaxed imputed income generated
by the non-working wife.
77. SUMMARY OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE REVENUE ACT OF 1951, supra note
42, at 6; Califano, 434 U.S. at 53.
78. Research shows that marriage rates overall have declined, and cohabitation
without marriage is on the rise. In 2016, the number of adults in the United States
cohabiting was about 18 million, up 29% since just 2007. See, e.g., Renee Stepler,
Number of U.S. adults cohabiting with a partner continues to rise, especially among
those 50 and older, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 6, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2017/04/06/number-of-u-s-adults-cohabiting-with-a-partner-continues-to-riseespecially-among-those-50-and-older/ [https://perma.cc/Q5KX-XGYH].
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reduce the marriage penalty.79 The 1986 Act sought to relieve low income
families of any federal income tax liability through increasing the personal
exemption, the standard deduction, and providing further for the Earned
Income Credit.80 These increases meant that the beginning point of income
tax liability was higher than the estimated poverty level in 1988 for all
families.81
In the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act
(“EGTRRA”) of 2001, Congress made further attempts to ameliorate the
marriage tax penalty.82 Along with increasing the standard deduction for a
couple that elects to file as Married Filing Jointly (“MFJ”) to twice that of
the unmarried individual standard deduction, that legislation also
increased the size of the 15% regular income tax rate bracket for a married
couple filing a joint return to twice the size of the corresponding rate
bracket for an unmarried individual filing a single return.83 This change
reversed the effect of the 1969 legislation that sought to address the
“singles penalty” for married taxpayers with taxable income up to the top
of the 25% marginal rate bracket.84

79. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 103, 95
Stat. 172, 187 established the “Deduction for Two-Earner Married Couples”
under a new § 221, while the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 131,
100 Stat. 2085, 2113 repealed the provision.
80. The Earned Income Tax Credit was added to the code through the Tax
Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, §43, 89 Stat. 30, but was increased
through a 1986 reform.
81. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 100TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION
OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, at 15 (Comm. Print 1987).
82. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L.
No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38.
83. Id. at 53–54; see also STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, 107TH CONG.,
GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION ENACTED IN THE 107TH CONGRESS
25–28 (Comm. Print 2003) [hereinafter GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX
LEGISLATION ENACTED IN THE 107TH CONGRESS]. This legislation made a third
advancement in pursuit of marriage penalty relief through various changes to the
Earned Income Credit. GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION ENACTED IN
THE 107TH CONGRESS, supra; see also I.R.C. § 32 (2012).
84. For 2016, MFJ taxpayers with taxable income over $75,300, but not over
$151,900, have a marginal tax rate of 25%; this rate is equal to Unmarried
Individuals with half such taxable income. For Unmarried Individuals, however,
the 25% marginal rate extends to taxable income not over $91,150, an amount in
excess of half of the top taxable income an MFJ taxpayer. Rev. Proc. 2015-53,
2015-44 I.R.B. 615. See Tracey M. Roberts, Brackets: A Historical Perspective,
108 NW. U. L. REV. 925 (2014), for a comprehensive consideration of tax brackets
over the past century.
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Although this change provided some marriage penalty relief, it failed
to provide sufficient family penalty relief. If two unmarried taxpayers
without qualifying dependents married and each spouse had a top marginal
rate of up to 25%, the couple did not suffer from a marriage penalty with
regard to tax rates on taxable income and may have even experienced a
marriage bonus. When either or both taxpayers had children, however, the
comparison of twice the Unmarried applicable marginal rate against the
MFJ applicable marginal tax rate is a logical fallacy. In this instance, one,
instead, must compare the HOH applicable rate plus the Unmarried rates
to the MFJ rates or, when both may have had qualified individually for the
HOH rates, twice the HOH rates are compared to the MFJ rates.85 As the
HOH taxable income bracket earnings are placed between the Unmarried
and the MFJ earnings allowable to earn a particular tax rate, this attempt
at offering marriage penalty relief failed to address family penalty relief in
any meaningful way.
Additionally, this 2001 congressional attempt at marriage penalty
relief for some failed to address the fundamental marriage and/or family
penalty issue then present in the structure of the individual income tax.
The extension of the 15% rate bracket for the Married taxpayer to twice
that of the corresponding rate bracket for an Unmarried taxpayer essentially
reintroduced income splitting for these taxpayers and made permissive joint
filing unnecessary for Two-Income No Children (“TINCs”) couples under
a certain income level.86 In drafting that legislation, Congress expressed
“concern[] about the inequity that arises when two working single
individuals marry and experience a tax increase solely by reason of their
marriage.”87 The legislative history reveals the intent behind these changes,
stating that
[a]ny attempt to address the marriage tax penalty involves the
85. See I.R.C. § 1(a)–(c), and the relevant Revenue Procedure for adjusted
for inflation brackets, to compare the effects of the applicable filing statuses on
the family penalty.
86. For 2016, this income level is $151,900 for married couples. See Rev.
Proc. 2015-53, 2015-44 I.R.B. 615. A 28% marginal tax rate begins for Married
Individuals Filing Joint Returns if taxable income is over $151,900. For
Unmarried Individuals, the 28% rate does not begin until taxable income is over
$91,150. Note, though, that for income levels near poverty levels or lower, or
twice such poverty level if married, there still may exist a significant marriage
penalty in accessing welfare or welfare-type programs like the Earned Income
Credit, discussed infra Part III.A.
87. STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAX’N, 108TH CONGRESS, GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION ENACTED IN THE 108TH CONGRESS 7 (J. Comm.
Print 2005).
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balancing of several competing principles, including equal tax
treatment of married couples with equal incomes, the determination
of equitable relative tax burdens of single individuals and married
couples with equal incomes, and the goal of simplicity in
compliance and administration.88
Although the changes made by this law may have done well to provide
more equal tax treatments of married couples to unmarried couples, that
movement toward equity was only true for couples with incomes within a
certain range who were unencumbered with children.
The 2017 tax reform, which took effect in 2018, made the biggest step
forward to eliminate the marriage penalty found in the tax brackets. From
January 1, 2018, the applicable tax rates only penalized married taxpayers
as against Unmarried Individuals who are not Heads of Households, with
taxable income over $600,000.89 That reform also addressed family
penalty relief, allowing for some additional benefit to unmarried
individuals with dependents but only for those with taxable income not
over $51,800.90 Although this change failed to provide universal relief, it
is a great step forward in supporting the family. This 2017 modification of
the code, however, will expire beginning in 2026 without Congressional
action.91
In addition to reducing both the marriage and family penalties, the
2017 bill doubled the child tax credit for that same period through 2025.92
The bill also eliminated, through 2025, the child tax credit marriage
penalty and raised the phase-out threshold from $75,000 for single
individuals or HOHs and $110,000 for married individuals filing joint
returns to $200,000 and $400,000, respectively.93 It is imperative that
Congress acts to make these changes permanent to prevent those severe
family penalties present in the code prior to January 1, 2018 from reemerging.

88. H. R. REP. NO. 107-29, at 6 (2001).
89. Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11001(a).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. The Child Tax Credit was doubled to $2,000 in the 2017 act. Id. §
11022(a).The 2001 EGTRRA similarly doubled the Child Tax Credit from $500
to $1,000. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L.
No. 107-16, § 201, 115 Stat. 38, 45.
93. Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11022(a).
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III. THE CODE’S AVERSION TO MARRIAGE: A CONCRETE DISCUSSION
OF CONGRESS’S ATTACK ON MARRIAGE
Though the smaller tax brackets allotted for married persons over the
tax brackets available for two single persons commonly have been the
center of the marriage penalty debate, the family penalty is much more
expansive.94 First, the family penalty considers, instead, the tax liability of
married joint filers as compared to the sum of income tax calculated using
one HOH tax bracket and one unmarried tax bracket for a couple with like
household income. For instance, consider a married couple with at least
one child in which each spouse has a taxable income of $80,000 and was
paying federal income taxes in 2016. The married couple would have had
a marriage penalty calculated against each spouse utilizing § 1(c) rates for
unmarried individuals but would have a family penalty calculated against
one spouse utilizing § 1(b) rates for HOH’s and one spouse utilizing § 1(c)
rates for unmarried individuals. This can be illustrated in the following
way:
Married Filing Joint Return Tax Liability:
$31,785.5095
HOH + Unmarried Individuals Tax Liability: $30,068.0096
Thus, one can see that mandated joint filing status in 2016 would have
resulted in a $1,717 penalty—although because of separate phase-out
thresholds for a smorgasbord of deductions, credits, and penalty devices,
as well as the ability to shift deductions to the filer with the higher marginal
tax rate, the penalty could have been significantly greater.97
94. See, e.g., Margaret Ryznar, To Work, or Not to Work? The Immortal Tax
Disincentives for Married Women, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 921, 926–30 (2009);
Shari Motro, A New “I Do”: Towards a Marriage-Neutral Income Tax, 91 IOWA L.
REV. 1509 (2006); Wendy C. Gerzog, The Marriage Penalty: The Working
Couple’s Dilemma, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 27 (1978); Bittker, supra note 10.
95. Rev. Proc. 2015-53, 2015-44 I.R.B. 615 (setting forth inflation-adjusted tax
code items for 2016). The Revenue Procedure shows adjustments to the tax rate tables
under § 1 for Table 1—§ 1(a)—Married Individuals Filing Joint Returns to calculate
tax if taxable income is over $151,900 but not over $231,450 as $29,517.50 plus 28%
of the excess over $151,900. This calculation assumes no credits. Id.
96. Id. The inflation adjustment for 2016 shows for Table 2—§ 1(b)—Heads
of Households to calculate tax if taxable income is over $50,400 but not over
$130,150 as $6,897.50 plus 25% of the excess over $50,400 and shows for Table
3—§ 1(c)—Unmarried Individuals to calculate tax if taxable income is over
$37,650 but not over $91,150 as $5,183.75 plus 25% of the excess over $37,650.
This calculation assumes no credits. Id. tbls.2, 3.
97. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
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An analysis of the Earned Income Credit, the Premium Tax Credit,
and the Mortgage Interest Deduction shows that the code’s bias against
marriage is the result of specific statutory provisions and not simply the
longstanding bias that had been inherent in the tax rate tables.
A. Beyond the Brackets: The Family Penalty and the Earned Income Tax
Credit
The refundable Earned Income Tax Credit (“EITC”), which is
available to low income taxpayers, is worth up to $6,269 for those with
three or more children but begins to phase out when an unmarried
taxpayer’s earned income reaches $18,190 for the year 2016.98 That same
credit for a married family with three or more children filing a joint return
will trigger the phase-out threshold when the married couple’s joint earned
income is only $5,550 more than the unmarried filer.99 Moreover, the
amount of the credit in relation to the number of children is not a multiple,
that is, for two children the credit may be as much as $5,572, but a taxpayer
with four children would only be able to receive $6,269 on one return. 100
This combination of elements seems to allow for multiple points of
manipulation with regard to a married versus an unmarried couple.101 For
98. Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, § 204, 89 Stat. 26, 30.
The EITC is a refundable credit, meaning that it may provide taxpayers with a
refund to the extent that the credit reduces his or her tax liability below zero. Id.;
see also I.R.C. § 32 (2012).
99. These phase-out thresholds and limits adjust for inflation and are reported
for the then current year in the applicable Revenue Procedure. In the case of an
individual who is married, the taxpayer may only claim the Earned Income Credit
if a joint return is filed. See § 32(d).
100. Note that the number of qualifying children that increase the amount of
the credit differentiates between zero, one, two, and three or more, and that
although two individuals, each with two children, would be able to receive a
maximum credit of $5,572, a married couple would be entitled only to the $6,269
credit available to a taxpayer with three or more qualifying children. See § 32(b).
101. The provision for the Earned Income Credit incorporates portions of the
rule for claiming a personal exemption for a dependent to define a “qualifying
child” of the taxpayer. § 32(c)(3)(A). That applicable portion of the rule allows
either parent to claim a child when the child has the same principal place of abode
for more than one-half of the taxable year as both parents and otherwise qualifies
as a “qualifying child” for both parents. Id. § 152(c)(4) (setting forth a special rule
relating to two or more who can claim the same qualifying child); see also
GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION ENACTED IN THE 107TH
CONGRESS, supra note 83, at 33 (explaining the 2002 change in tie-breaking law
when both parents claim the child and the parents do not file a joint return
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instance, in 2016, in a three-child family in which one spouse is the
primary earner for the family making as little as $36,000 and the other
spouse works part time earning $18,000, the married taxpayers would not
be entitled to any EITC while an unmarried couple of comparable income
could be entitled to $6,269 in a fully refundable credit.102 The extreme
limits of this family penalty would result when each individual earned
about $18,000 and would be able to receive the maximum amount of
credit, together $12,538, though that married couple would be limited to a
measly $581 through the EITC.103 This would create a nearly $12,000
family penalty for a married couple with earned income of just over
$36,000.
Married Filing Joint Return EITC Eligibility:
HOH + HOH Filers EITC Eligibility:

$581.00104
$12,538.00105

together, then the child is considered a qualifying child of the parent with the
highest adjusted gross income—this tie-breaking rule, though, is where both
parents claim the child).
102. For 2016, a taxpayer is able to receive a $6,269 credit with three or more
qualifying children when he earns at least $13,930, though, an unmarried taxpayer
must not have an adjusted gross income of more than $18,190 to receive the full credit;
a married taxpayer may not receive any credit when adjusted gross income on his joint
return reaches $53,505. See Rev. Proc. 2015-53, § 3.06, 1015-44 I.R.B. 615.
103. This calculation assumes six children in order for the couple to each receive
the $6,269 credit value for three or more children. This credit value penalty was
calculated assuming that each spouse earns an amount equal to the threshold phaseout for a single person or HOH of $18,190. Filing as Unmarried, they would be
entitled to the twice the maximum credit for a taxpayer, but filing as married they
would only be entitled to one $6,269 credit. That one $6,269 credit would be reduced
by 45% of which their earned income exceeds the threshold phase-out amount for
joint filers ($36,380-$23,740 = $12,640; 45% x $12,640 = $5,688; $6269-$5,688 =
$581). See § 32(b), for the phase-out percentage for three or more qualifying children,
and see Rev. Proc. 2015-53, 2015-44 I.R.B. 615, for 2016 adjusted-for-inflation
amounts for maximum amount of credit and phase-out thresholds.
104. Rev. Proc. 2015-53, 2015-44 I.R.B. 615, which sets forth inflationadjusted tax code items for 2016, shows adjustments to the tax rate tables under §
1 for Table 1—§ 1(a)—Married Individuals Filing Joint Returns to calculate tax
if taxable income is over $151,900 but not over $231,450 as $29,517.50 plus 28%
of the excess over $151,900. This assumes no credits. Id.
105. The inflation adjustment for 2016 shows for Table 2—§ 1(b)—Heads of
Households to calculate tax if taxable income is over $50,400 but not over
$130,150 as $6,897.50 plus 25% of the excess over $50,400 and shows for Table
3—§ 1(c)—Unmarried Individuals to calculate tax if taxable income is over

2017]

NEGATING THE COST OF “I DO”

527

The EITC, as introduced in 1975, required eligibility to be based on
joint income in the case of a married couple but allowed for no additional
earnings in reaching the phase-out threshold over that of an unmarried
person.106 That 1975 credit also differed because it was a credit uniquely
designed for those with children, requiring that an eligible individual
maintain a household for that individual and a child of that individual. 107
The Senate explained the purpose in creating the Earned Income Credit in
that
the most significant objective . . . should be to assist in encouraging
people to obtain employment, reducing the unemployment rate and
reducing the welfare rolls and that importantly, Federal welfare
programs apply primarily to married couples with dependent
children and it is in this area where this program can be most
effective in reducing any tax disincentive to work.108
The EITC in its initial iteration focused on remediating the expenses in
providing for a child in a very low income household without regard to the
number of incomes affecting the earnings.109 The focus in that first
iteration of the EITC was on the dependent child and the resources
available to support him.110 Thus, it was logical to consider only household
income in calculating the credit. In 1975, as today, marital status was

$37,650 but not over $91,150 as $5,183.75 plus 25% of the excess over $37,650.
This assumes no credits. Id. tbls.2, 3.
106. That 1975 law allowed for a credit to be taken as against $4,000 of earned
income to any taxpayer with married taxpayers’ phase-out threshold calculated
based on joint income and unmarried individuals’ phase-out threshold based on
only their income, which would amount to $17,907 in 2016 dollars. The 2016
credit is allowed against up to $13,930 for three or more children but only up to
$9,920 for one child. Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, § 204(a), 89
Stat. 26, 30; see also Rev. Proc. 2015-53, § 3.06, 2015-44 I.R.B. 615.
107. See Tax Reduction Act of 1975 § 204(a). The House version of the bill did
not require the taxpayer to maintain a household with a child and as such provided,
instead, for special rules for individuals under 18 years old and for individuals
employed by a family relative. See also S. REP. NO. 94-36, at 34–35 (1975).
108. See S. REP. NO. 94-36, at 38 (internal quotation marks omitted).
109. See Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., The Collision of Tax and Welfare Politics: The
Political History of the Earned Income Tax Credit, 1969-99, 53 NAT’L TAX J.
983, 995–96 (2000).
110. Id.; see also Tax Reduction Act of 1975 § 204.
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utilized to represent household composition, assuming that a co-habitating
couple with a dependent child was married.111
The current version of the credit has expanded to individuals without
children, however, though in a much more limited amount.112 For instance,
the credit is worth as much as $6,269 for a household with three or more
children but is limited to $506 for a household without any qualifying
children.113 The current version of the credit also has allowed for that
slightly higher phase-out threshold for married filers since 2002 as an
attempt for that threshold amount to represent earnings that encompass
that second earner.114 The result, though, of the current formation of the
EITC is that a couple with a joint income of about $36,000 could face a
tax penalty of nearly $12,000 per year after hearing those wedding bells.115

111. See David T. Ellwood, The Impact of the Earned Income Tax Credit and
Social Policy Reforms on Work, Marriage, and Living Arrangements, 53 NAT’L
TAX J. 1063 (2000).
112. The original 1975 credit allowed for a refundable credit equal to ten percent
on earned income to a certain amount—$4,000—when, at the time, the social
security tax rate on employees was 5.85%. See supra note 106. Though the 1975
Earned Income Credit was only available to households with qualifying children,
the 2016 credit for individuals without qualifying children is 7.65%, which is equal
to current payroll taxes. This credit percentage rises to 45% in the case of an eligible
individual with three or more qualifying children. I.R.C. § 32(b)(1) (2012).
113. Rev. Proc. 2015-53, § 3.06, 2015-44 I.R.B. 615. The credit percentage for
a taxpayer with three or more qualifying children is 45%, but the credit percentage
for a taxpayer with no qualifying children is equal to 7.65%, the employee share of
payroll taxes. § 32(b)(1).
114. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L.
No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38; GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION ENACTED
IN THE 107TH CONGRESS, supra note 83, at 28–34. Through the Economic Growth
and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act legislation, Congress identified the issue that
the earned income amount penalized some taxpayers who would receive a smaller
Earned Income Credit if married than if not married. A separate phase-out threshold
for married couples was available since that 2001 legislation, then allowing for the
beginning and ending of the Earned Income Credit phase-out to increase by $1,000
for a married couple filing a joint return for taxable years beginning in 2002, 2003,
and 2004; increasing to $2,000 for taxable years beginning in 2005, 2006, and
2007; and to $3,000 in a taxable year beginning after 2007 and then adjusted
annually for inflation after 2008. GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION
ENACTED IN THE 107TH CONGRESS, supra note 83, at 28–34.
115. See supra notes100–101.
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B. The Premium Tax Credit’s Impact on the Family Penalty
The Premium Tax Credit (“PTC”), which subsidizes health insurance
premiums for low income families, became law by act of Congress on
March 23, 2010 as part of the Affordable Care Act.116 The credit is
available to low and middle income taxpayers that purchase health
insurance on health care exchanges and allows such taxpayers to receive
advance payment of a refundable credit to pay for the cost of their monthly
health insurance premiums.117
The amount of the PTC that a taxpayer may receive is based on a
taxpayer’s household income.118 The “household income” used to
determine the amount of the PTC is equal to the aggregate adjusted gross
income of the taxpayer plus the income of all other individuals for which
the taxpayer is allowed a personal exemption.119 The aggregate income
amount must not exceed 400% of the poverty line for a family of the size
involved.120 Thus, the PTC that a taxpayer may receive is reduced as
household income increases, as impacted by a marriage-based filing
status.121
The 2016 Poverty Guidelines, issued by the United States Department
of Health and Human Services (“HHS”), set the poverty line at $11,880
for a single-person household, an amount that increases by an average of
$4,150 as each person is added to the household.122 Thereby, the PTC is
116. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), Pub. L. No. 111-148,
§ 1401, 124 Stat. 119, 213 (2010). The PTC applies to taxable years ending after
December 31, 2013. § 1401(e).
117. The ACA provides that tax credits shall be allowed for any applicable
taxpayer if the taxpayer has enrolled in an insurance plan through “an Exchange
established by the State under 1311 of the [ACA].” § 1401(c)(2). King v. Burwell, 576
U.S. _(2015) (6-3), 135 S. Ct. 2480, however, determined that such PTCs are available
to individuals in States that have a Federal Exchange and not a State Exchange. But
see King, 135 S. Ct. at 2496 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (finding such a determination “quite
absurd,” one that “goes beyond giving words bizarre meanings,” using “jiggerypokery” to interpret the law in line with “the overriding principle of the present Court:
The Affordable Care Act must be saved”).
118. 26 C.F.R. 1.36B-2(b)(1) (2017).
119. Id.
120. “Poverty line” has the meaning given that term in § 2110(c)(5) of the Social
Security Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1397jj(c)(5) (2012); I.R.C. § 36B(c)(1)(A) (2012).
121. If the taxpayer is married at the close of the taxable year, the taxpayer is
eligible for the PTC only if the taxpayer and the taxpayer’s spouse file a joint
return for the taxable year. See § 36B(c)(1)(C).
122. This value is applicable for the 48 contiguous states and the District of
Columbia; separate Poverty Guidelines for Alaska are issued in the Update in
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available to households with fairly generous income levels, phasing out
only for married parents with six dependent children with an adjusted
gross income over $163,560 in 2016.123 Though such a family would be
entitled to a very small PTC, the value of the credit is maximized for a
family of eight when the adjusted gross income is less than $54,383.124
The credit effectively limits the cost of health insurance purchased on
an exchange to a percentage of household income for individuals with a
household income of up to 400% of the poverty line.125 For instance, in
2016, eligible taxpayers with household income of less than 133% of the
poverty line were limited to paying 2.03% of their monthly income
towards their monthly premium, with the PTC covering the remainder.126
The monthly premium upon which the credit is based, however, is that of
the applicable second lowest cost silver plan available in the individual
market in the rating area in which the taxpayer resides (“Benchmark
Plan”)—even if this is not the plan that the taxpayer has purchased.127
which the poverty line for a household of one is $14,840, increasing by $5,180–
$5,200 per additional person in the household. Annual Update of the HHS Poverty
Guidelines, 81 Fed. Reg. 4036, 4036–4037 (Jan. 25, 2016).
123. The PTC uses a modified adjusted gross income (“MAGI”) to calculate
household income in determining PTC amount. That MAGI is equal to adjusted
gross income plus any amount excluded from gross income under § 911, increased
by any amount of interest received or accrued that is exempt from tax and by an
amount equal to the portion of the taxpayer’s social security benefits not included
in gross income under I.R.C. § 86. See § 36B(d)(2)(B).
124. The HHS Poverty Guidelines allow for $40,890 for a household of eight
while the PTC begins to phase out at 133% of the poverty line, or $54,383. §
36B(b)(3)(A)(i). For 2016, the PTC is equal to the difference between 2.03% to
9.66% of the taxpayer’s MAGI and the premium for the applicable second lowest
cost silver plan, Rev. Proc. 2014-62, 2014-50 I.R.B. 948, as prescribed by §
36B(b)(3)(A)(i) and 26 C.F.R. 1.36B-3T(g) (2017).
125. See 26 C.F.R. 1.36B-2(b)(1) (2017).
126. These “premium percentages” are indexed in the case of taxable years
beginning in any calendar year after 2014 to reflect the excess of the rate of
premium growth over the rate of income growth, with the given numbers those
applicable for 2016 via Revenue Procedure 2014-62.
127. The PTC is the lesser of the monthly premium or the excess of the
monthly premium for the second lowest silver plan with respect to the taxpayer
over the product of the applicable percentage and the taxpayer’s household
income for the taxable year. Thus, a taxpayer may pay less than the applicable
percentage of her household income towards her premium if she were to purchase
a lower cost health plan—for instance, if she purchases the lowest cost silver plan;
or may pay more than the applicable percentage of her household income if she
were to purchase a higher cost health plan—for instance, if she purchases the third
lowest cost silver plan. See § 36B(b).
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Taxpayers with household income of up to 400% of the poverty line are
limited to paying 9.66% of their monthly income towards their monthly
premium based on the Benchmark Plan in 2016.128
For example, in Washington, D.C., individual health insurance is
offered through that government’s exchange, DC Health Link.129 The
exchange’s website offers a list of the cost of the monthly premium by age
for that government’s Benchmark Plan.130 For the couple with six
dependent children that was considered in the previous section of this
Article, the premium without the PTC could cost as much as $2,140 per
month.131 If the couple were married and each spouse earned $82,000
annually, he or she would receive no PTC, but if either spouse were
unmarried, he or she could receive as much as $754 each month or $9,054
per year.132 If, instead, one parent of the unmarried couple earned $48,850
128. See id. In the case of household income from 300% to 400% expressed
as a percent of the poverty line, the initial premium percentage for 2014 was 9.5%
and is indexed as explained, supra note 121, so that for 2016 those taxpayers may
receive a refundable tax credit for the difference between 9.5% of household
income over the applicable second lowest silver plan of the individual market in
the rating area in which the taxpayer resides. See id.
129. Chapter 31D of the Washington, D.C. Code implements the elements of the
Affordable Care Act to create its health benefit exchange. See D.C. CODE § 313171.01 (2017).
130. For the D.C. exchange, DC Health Link, the Benchmark Plan is the Kaiser
Permanent DC Silver 2750/20%/HSA/Dental/Ped Dental HMO. See the table
showing applicable monthly premiums, DC HEALTH LINK, 2016 SECOND LOWEST
COST SILVER PLAN COSTS 1 tbl.1 (2016), https://dchealthlink.com/sites/default/files
/v2/pdf/2016_SLCSP_Listing.pdf [https://perma.cc/6DCV-Y7ZU].
131. This calculation uses that DC Health Link table. See id. The calculation
assumes that the six dependent children covered under the parent’s or parents’
plan are between 21 and 23 and then would have a monthly premium of $178.41
each and that the parents are each 61 and above with a premium of $535.22.
($178.41 x 6 + $535.22 x 2 = $2,140.90).
132. The PTC is not available when household income exceeds 400% of the
poverty line for a family of the size involved. The poverty line for a family of
eight is $40,890, see supra note 124, where $163,560 would be 400% of that
value. A household income of $82,000 x 2 = $164,000 would put this household’s
income over the threshold for receiving the PTC. If unmarried, though, each
parent separately would be considered for this credit. One parent could file as an
Unmarried Individual with no dependents and that parent would not qualify for a
PTC. See § 36B(c)(1)(A). The other parent, though, could claim all of the children
on her return and qualify for a generous PTC. Id. Thus, that parent who filed as
an Unmarried Individual would be responsible for the full $535.22 monthly cost
in purchasing the Benchmark Plan, and the other parent would be limited to
paying about 7.23% of her household income toward the $1,605.68 premium for
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and the other earned at least $115,000, the PTC would increase to about
$1,523 per month or about $18,276 per year; though married, the couple
still would receive no credit.133 Thus, the annual marriage penalty for this
recently enacted tax credit is significant:
Married Earnings of $82,000 each:
Married Earnings of $48,850/$115,000:

$9,054
$18,276

Furthermore, as these PTCs are paid by the government to the issuer
of the health plan on a monthly basis to reduce the premium charged to the
insured for each period, this monthly $754 or $1,523 is an important piece
of each family’s monthly spending, rather than a “windfall-esque” credit
claimed with the taxpayer’s tax return filing.134 Though the EITC has the
ability to create a similarly substantial marriage penalty for low income
households, this credit expands a hefty marriage penalty to substantially

herself and six 21 to 23-year-old children. ($178.41 x 6 + $535.22 = $1,605.68).
That would result in a monthly $754.52 PTC. ($1,605.68 - 7.23% of $82,000/12
= $754.52). See id.
133. To be eligible for the PTC, a taxpayer generally must have household
income that equals or exceeds 100% of the poverty line. Id. The poverty line for
a household of seven is $36,730 in 2016; $48,850.90 is 133% of the poverty line
for a family of that size. Id. The premium percentage, which is the percentage of
monthly household income required to pay into the cost of the monthly premium
of the Benchmark Plan, is lowest when household income is less than 133% of
the poverty line. § 36B(b)(3)(A)(i). That percentage for 2016 is 2.03%. Rev. Proc.
2014-62, § 2.01, 2014-50 I.R.B. 948. The unmarried couple would have a monthly
PTC equal to the Benchmark Plan cost of $1,605.68 over 2.03% of 1/12 of the
annual income of $48,850—$1,523.04. Once the household income exceeds
400% of the poverty line for this family of eight, or $163,560, they become
ineligible for the PTC. § 36B(c)(1)(A). Note that though the example utilizes
applicable Benchmark Plan rates for Washington, D.C. and valid PTC premium
percentages based on the relevant poverty line at 100% to 133%, Washington,
D.C. has expanded its Medicaid program to parents to 216% of the applicable
poverty line and to adults to 210% of the applicable poverty line. Thus, though
this family may be eligible for Medicaid coverage, this example demonstrates the
inherent bias against marriage in the PTC calculation if they purchased insurance
on the Exchange. MEDICAID AND CHIP PAYMENT AND ACCESS COMM’N,
MACSTATS: MEDICAID AND CHIP DATA BOOK 94 ex.35 (Dec. 2016).
134. The Affordable Care Act prescribes for advanced determinations and
payment of premium tax credits and cost-sharing reductions. Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1412, 124 Stat. 119, 231–32
(2010).
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higher income families and a substantially greater percentage of American
taxpayers.135
C. The Mortgage Interest Deduction’s Marriage Disincentive
On August 7, 2015, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals provided
another reason for remaining single when it determined that unmarried coowners of real property were entitled to utilize the home Mortgage Interest
Deduction on a per taxpayer basis.136 The Internal Revenue Service
followed Voss v. Commissioner with an Action on Decision (“AOD”) to
acquiesce in August of 2016.137 A return filed under the status of “Married
Filing Jointly” is considered one taxpayer, just as a return filed as
“Unmarried” or “HOH.” The home Mortgage Interest Deduction provision
of the code allows for a deduction of interest paid on up to $1 million of
qualified residence interest in 2018.138
The American tax system is a progressive system, meaning that the
higher an individual’s taxable income, the higher the tax rate applied to
those last dollars earned—with marginal tax rates ranging from 10% to
37% in 2018.139 Thus, the value of a deduction to a taxpayer generally is
considered to be the amount of the deduction multiplied by that taxpayer’s
marginal tax rate.140 Considering the married taxpayer couple and the
unmarried committed couple, both with $2 million of qualified residence
interest and a mortgage interest rate of seven percent, the tax savings
disparity is quite dramatic.141 The married couple would pay seven percent
135. See discussion supra Part III; see also DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS., ASPE DATA POINT: ABOUT 2.5 MILLION PEOPLE WHO CURRENTLY BUY
COVERAGE OFF-MARKETPLACE MAY BE ELIGIBLE FOR ACA SUBSIDIES (Oct. 4,
2016), https://aspe.hhs.gov/system/files/pdf/208306/OffMarketplaceSubsidyeligible
.pdf [https://perma.cc/V9XX-YK8D]. This publication estimates that 11.9 million
consumers are eligible for Premium Tax Credits. Id. at 2.
136. Voss v. Comm’r., 796 F.3d 1051, 1053 (9th Cir. 2015), acq., IRS
Announcement 2016-02, 2016-31 I.R.B. 193 (Aug. 1, 2016).
137. IRS Announcement 2016-25, 2016-31 I.R.B. 193 (Aug. 1, 2016).
138. I.R.C. § 163(h)(3). The 2017 tax reform law reduced the limitation to
$750,000 and disallowed home equity indebtedness as qualified indebtedness for
indebtedness generally incurred after December 15, 2017. The $1 million limitation
remains applicable through 2025 for prior incurred debt. Pub. L. No. 115-97, §
11043(a).
139. I.R.C. § 1.
140. See id. §§ 1, 63.
141. The Freddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey®, Monthly Average
Commitment Rate and Points On 30-Year Fixed-Rate Mortgages Since 1971 is a
survey of lenders on the rates and points for their most popular mortgage products
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of $2 million, or $140,000, in interest on their mortgages but would be
limited to deducting interest on only $1 million of mortgages, or $70,000.
The unmarried committed couple according to Voss and the AOD, though,
would have twice that limit and may deduct interest paid on up to $2
million of mortgages, or the full $140,000.142 If all parties were subject to
the highest marginal rate, that may amount to a tax savings of as much as
$25,900 for the married couple and a tax savings of as much as $51,800
for the committed couple.143
This value may be made up of two separate residences per taxpayer—
the principal residence and one other residence; thus, for a married couple,
they are limited to two residences, but an unmarried couple potentially
could deduct the interest on four separate residences.144 A residence may
include a boat, vacation home, or pied-à-terre that otherwise satisfies the
use definition that requires that sleeping space, a toilet, and cooking
facilities be present.145 That use definition makes clear that the code
essentially is allowing for deductible interest on one “bonus” residence
that may be a recreational vehicle or watercraft.146 For a couple that may
have separate principal residences when, perhaps, their careers are in
different cities, they may be subject to concomitant high cost real estate
markets. For instance, the median price of a two-bedroom apartment in
Midtown Manhattan was over $3 million in the first quarter of 2016 while
based on first-lien prime conventional conforming home purchase mortgages with
a loan-to-value of 80%. This survey shows that average rates plus points have
ranged from just over nine and a half to just under three and a half since 2000.
This calculation does not take into account the Pease Limitation found in IRC §
68 that may reduce allowable itemized deductions of up to 80% of itemized
deductions otherwise allowable for such taxable year. 30 Year Fixed-Rate
Mortgages Since 1971, FREDDIE MAC, http://www.freddiemac.com/pmms/pmms
30.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2017) [https://perma.cc/M8NN-SW25].
142. Voss v. Comm’r., 796 F.3d 1051, 1053 (9th Cir. 2015), acq., IRS
Announcement 2016-02, 2016-31 I.R.B. 193 (Aug. 1, 2016).
143. The highest marginal rate for both married and unmarried taxpayers for
2018 is 37%. § 1.
144. Id. §§ 163(h)(4)(A)(i), 280A(d).
145. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-10T(p)(3)(ii) (1987) requires the determination of
whether a property is a residence be based on all of the facts and circumstances,
including good faith of the taxpayer and explains that a “residence generally
includes a house, condominium, mobile home, boat, or house trailer, that contains
sleeping space and toilet and cooking facilities.” § 280A(d) requires that the
taxpayer use the dwelling unit as a residence for either more than 14 days per year
or for more than ten percent of the number of days in the year in which the unit is
rented at a fair rental, whichever is greater. § 280A(d).
146. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-10T(p)(3)(ii); §§ 163(h)(4)(A)(i), 280A(d).
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a two-bedroom condo cost over $2 million for a moderately priced
residence in a central San Francisco neighborhood.147 In such a case, a
married couple filing under the married filing jointly status would be
placed at a disadvantage to unmarried committed couples because the
married couple would be limited to two residences although the unmarried
committed couple could use the interest paid on both city apartments in
computing their deduction as well as up to two additional residences.
D. Certain Tax Credits and Deductions Further the Anti-Family
Structure of the Tax Code
The EITC is an anti-poverty credit that largely affects individuals with
very low income.148 The mechanism aims to support children in
households with low earned income, and, historically, marriage was a
strong indicator of the economic resources of a household. On the other
hand, the Mortgage Interest Deduction’s penalty begins only when the
mortgage or mortgages exceed $1 million or there are more than two
homes attached to the mortgages. Both the EITC and the Mortgage Interest
Deduction’s social objectives of lifting children out of poverty and of
putting quite high upper limits on subsidizations of home ownership
contain inherent family penalties through the over-generalization of the
economic consequences of marriage.
This resultant family penalty arguably may be tolerated, even with the
objective of horizontal equity between married and unmarried couples,
because the functions of the provisions are akin more to mechanisms to
effectuate such social objectives rather than to determine a taxpayer’s “fair
share.” The Premium Tax Credit, though, is a code provision that affects
a wide spectrum of middle-class American taxpayers. Although universal
health insurance is likewise an important social goal, Americans have left
healthcare as a consumption choice, an aspect that is apparent even in the
147. The Corcoran Report: 1Q16 Manhattan, CORCORAN GRP. REAL ESTATE 17
(2016), http://media.corcoran.com/pdf/reports/2016_Q1/Manhattan_Q12016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8GHW-XMGQ]; San Francisco Neighborhood Home Price
Tables, PARAGON REAL ESTATE GRP., https://www.paragon-re.com/trend/currentsf-home-value-tables-by-neighborhood (last updated Oct. 2017) [https://perma.cc
/23TS-83ZC].
148. The availability of the EITC is dependent on the earned income of the
taxpayer, the taxpayer’s filing status, and the number of dependents that a taxpayer
claims. See I.R.C. § 32. For instance, in 2017 the EITC was available to Unmarried
Individuals without dependents with earned income under $15,010 and to MFJ
taxpayers with three or more children with earned income up to $53,930. Rev. Proc.
2016-55, § 3.05, I.R.B. 2016-45.
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ACA given the range of coverages available that qualify as “minimum
essential coverage.”149 Due to the PTC’s function as an advanced monthly
payment against a mandatory purchase, the direct and prominent effect on
household finances has extended the family penalty unnecessarily and
highlighted state-sanctioned marriage as a costly expense.150
IV. PERMISSIVE JOINT FILING WILL ALLOW FOR NECESSARY
SUPPORT OF THE FAMILY
A. Defining Permissive Joint Filing
The Internal Revenue Code of 1939 contained all statutes relating
exclusively to internal revenue in force at that time, derived from 164
separate enactments of Congress.151 It contained 33 separate marginal tax
rates and one filing status.152 The Internal Revenue Code of 1954
contained 24 income tax brackets and three filing statuses and the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 contained 15 brackets and four filing statuses.153
The current code, the Internal Revenue Act of 1986, as amended in 2017,
similarly contains four filing statuses, though the number of marginal tax
rates has been reduced to seven.154
The current federal income tax scheme allows for four separate filing
statuses for taxpayers.155 HOHs and Unmarried Individuals are available
to those not married, and Married Individuals Filing Joint Returns and
Married Individuals Filing Separate Returns are the two options available
to married couples.156 Under the current law, spouses have the option of
149. The ACA allows for a variety of health care coverage options that qualify
for “essential minimum coverage” under the Act. See Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148, § 1501, 124 Stat. 248; I.R.C. § 5000A(f).
150. In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519
(2012), the Court held that although the individual mandate exceeded Congress’s
power under the Commerce Clause, reading the “penalty” as a tax was a
permissible interpretation of the law and such a “tax” for failing to engage in the
commercial action of purchasing minimum essential coverage is within
Congress’s taxing powers. But see Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11081, which eliminates
the penalty for months beginning after December 31, 2018.
151. Internal Revenue Code of 1939, 76 Cong. ch. 2, Preface, 53 Stat. 1 (1939).
152. See id.
153. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, § 1, 68A Stat. 5, 5–
6; Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 101, 100 Stat. 2085, 2096–99.
154. I.R.C. § 1.
155. § 1(e) provides for a fifth status, “Estates and Trusts,” though that status
is not available to an individual, whether married or unmarried.
156. § 1(a)–(d).
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filing jointly or separately.157 Generally, when filing separately, spouses
receive reductions in allowances and phase-outs equal to half of that which
would be permitted if the two were filing jointly, though some credits
become unavailable when spouses file separately.158 Married couples have
the freedom, however, to make an election to file under one filing status
in one year with no binding effect on filing status for any other taxable
year.159 As such, spouses may choose to change their filing status in each
year without requiring the consent of the Commissioner of Revenue,
which tends to be required for other similar changes.160
As shown throughout this Article, married taxpayers with a marginal
rate of 25% or higher may face a higher tax liability than they would if
they remained or became unmarried.161 Code provisions, such as the EITC,
157. See id. § 6013.
158. O.D. 968, 5 CUM. BULL. 195 (1921). Note, though, that many provisions
that allow for a deduction or credit, or limitations on such, are halved for those
choosing a Married Filing Separately status. See the tax tables for each listed in §
1(a) and (d), for which marginal rate brackets are reduced by half for those married
persons filing separately; see also I.R.C. § 1411, for the Unearned Income Medicare
Contribution when, in the case of a married taxpayer filing a separate return, the
threshold amount for which the contribution applies is one-half of the dollar amount
in the case of which is applicable to a taxpayer making a joint return; and I.R.C. §
163(h)(3)(B), providing that qualified residence interest is limited to interest on an
amount not exceeding $1 million for a taxpayer or $500,000 in the case of a married
individual filing a separate return until 2026—reduced to $750,000 and $375,000,
respectively, for indebtedness incurred after December 15, 2017 and on all
indebtedness beginning after December 31, 2025. Other benefits are not available
for married couples that file separately. See I.R.C. § 23(f)(1) (stating that married
couples must file joint returns to qualify for the adoption expenses credit); see also
I.R.C. § 25A(g)(6) (stating that no credit is available for married individuals filing
separate returns for the Hope Scholarship Credit or the Lifetime Learning Credit);
I.R.C. § 21(e) (stating that married couples must file joint returns to utilize the
dependent care credit).
159. An individual’s filing status may change from year to year; there is no
requirement to maintain a filing status once one is selected. See § 1; Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1-1 (as amended 2008).
160. For instance, if a corporation elects to be taxed as an S-corporation under
I.R.C. § 1362 and then terminates such election, in order for that corporation to
reelect S-corporation status before the fifth taxable year, the corporation requires
consent from the Secretary of the Treasury. See § 1362(g); see also id. § 446(e)
(stating that to change the method of accounting used to compute his income tax,
a taxpayer must secure the consent of the Secretary of the Treasury).
161. Note, in particular, the rate changes enacted through the American
Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, which reintroduced the marginal tax rate of 39.6%
for MFJ taxable income in excess of $450,000, $425,000 in the case of an HOH
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the PTC, and the Mortgage Interest Deduction, may allow for substantially
greater tax relief to individuals with similar income levels but different
marital statuses.162 In other words, married individuals without children
are prejudiced as compared to two unmarried individuals filing as such,
and some married individuals with children are disadvantaged compared
to an unmarried couple with children—a couple who is afforded the
benefit of one unmarried status and one HOH filing status.163
The cumulative effect of these marital penalties creates the potential for
an immense family penalty in an era in which marriage rates have declined
and cohabitation rates have risen.164 This change in the composition of
American households alone requires a reconsideration of the foundations of
a tax system that utilizes marriage status as an indicator of the economic
resources available to a taxpayer’s family. Instead, developments in the
practice of marriage mandate that a married filing status must be left as
permissive joint filing to achieve the horizontal equity goals upon which
the tax system is founded. A permissive joint filing regime would discard
filer, and $400,000 in the case of an Unmarried Individual filer; and the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148, § 9015, 124 Stat. 119, 870
(2010), which places a Medicare Surtax on net investment income in excess of a
taxpayer’s modified adjusted gross income above $250,000 for MFJ and in excess
of $200,000 for individuals. American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No.
112-240, § 101, 126 Stat. 2313, 2316 (2013). Though it may be plausible that such
code provisions have little effect on marriage choices, it is irrelevant for this
argument. The proposition here is that the design of our new code should be based
in pro-family, marriage neutral terms and so then, a structure that penalizes
marriage but does not actually result in marriage aversions remains one that fails
marriage neutrality. See, e.g., Alstott, supra note 13, at 559–61.
162. See discussion supra Part III. Note, additionally, the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act § 9015, which places a Medicare Surtax on net investment
income in excess of a taxpayer’s modified adjusted gross income above $250,000
for MFJ and in excess of $200,000 for individuals. American Taxpayer Relief Act
of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, § 101, 126 Stat. 2313, 2316 (2013).
163. See supra note 159.
164. Lawrence W. Waggoner, Marriage is on the Decline and Cohabitation is
on the Rise: At What Point, if Ever, Should Unmarried Partners Acquire Marital
Rights?, 50 FAM. L. Q. 215, 215–24 (2016). From 2000 to 2010, the percent of
unmarried couple households in the United States in relation to all households has
increased 1.4% from 5.2% to 6.6% or from about 5.5 million households to about
7.75 million households. During the same decade, the percent of married
households decreased from 51.7% of all households in 2000 to 48.4% of all
households in 2010. DAPHNE LOFQUIST ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2010
CENSUS BRIEFS: HOUSEHOLDS AND FAMILIES 5 tbl.2 (Apr. 2012). Note that these
2010 Census statistics were calculated when same-sex partners could not be
considered married under federal law.
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the Married Individuals Filing Separate Returns filing status in favor of
allowing such individuals to use the Unmarried Individuals or the HOH
filing status as an alternative to joint filing.165
B. Permissive Joint Filing, the Marriage Bonus, and a Win for Gender
Equality
Though the focus of this analysis and proposal certainly is to address
the significant family penalty that may be imposed by using a married
filing status, whether MFJ or Married Filing Separately, the benefits that
may accrue from the MFJ filing status are equally important to the
argument for permissive joint filing. When one spouse earns more than the
other spouse, aggregating income affords the higher earning spouse
benefits from wider tax brackets, essentially utilizing lower rates that the
secondary earner or non-earner does not exhaust due to his low income.166
Filing together also may result in a bonus when one spouse’s losses can
offset income or gains of the other spouse.167
The introduction of joint filing in the American tax system followed
from state community property laws, such as those discussed in Seaborn,
in which the earnings of one spouse are treated as earnings of the marriage
rather that of the individual.168 In 1859, the Supreme Court of California
described the state’s community property regime in declaring that the
“statute proceeds upon the theory that the marriage, in respect to property
acquired during its existence, is a community of which each spouse is a
member, equally contributing by his or her industry to its prosperity, and
165. See Margaret Ryznar, A Practical Solution to the Marriage Penalty, 44
PEPP. L. REV. 647, 683 (2017), for an alternative. Professor Ryznar proposes an
additional filing status for only two-income married couples that earn an amount
within a particular percentage of each other, offering double the rates of single
filers and thus accommodating both incomes. Id.
166. The reduction of the marriage penalty for most married couples through
revised tax brackets essentially returned income splitting to married couples,
effective after 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11001(a).
167. I.R.C. § 1.6013-4(b) (2012) provides that in a joint filing, tax liability is
computed upon aggregate income and aggregate deductions. See S. REP. NO. 801013, at 53 (1948) (although there are two taxpayers, there is only one net income).
Capital losses sustained by one spouse may offset gains by the other. Helvering v.
Janney, 311 U.S. 189, 194–95 (1940). Net operating losses sustained by one spouse
may offset income of another spouse. Calvin v. United States, 235 F. Supp. 594,
598 (D. Colo. 1964). In computing the net income on a joint return, their combined
charitable contributions are deductible from their aggregate gross income up to 15%
of the aggregate net income. Taft v. Helvering, 311 U.S. 195, 196 (1940).
168. See discussion of Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930) supra Part I.A.
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possessing an equal right to succeed to the property after dissolution.”169
The recognition of a married woman as a separate juridical entity from her
husband allows a wife to own property and recognizes her equal contribution
through her own acts on behalf of the family to earning such marital property
acquisitions.170 By allowing for the use of wider tax brackets for a single
income married couple even when no children are present, the code
recognizes the value of the non-earning spouse in generating the earnings of
the other spouse.171
For instance, the 2017 changes to the code that increased the size of
the regular income tax bracket for most married couples filing a joint
return now preserves an equal tax bracket allocation for that non-earner to
the primary earner.172 This allocation is in addition to any provision for
other types of dependents, such as children.173 In enacting such a
169. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 577 (1979) (quoting Meyer v.
Kinzer, 12 Cal. 247, 251 (1859)); see also In re Marriage of Valli, 324 P.3d 274,
283 (2014) (Chin, J., concurring) (citing this Meyer v. Kinzer language for
reliance on interpretation of “substantially similar” language in CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 760 (West 2014), a law at issue in that case).
170. See, e.g., Boggs v. Boggs, 82 F.3d 90, 96 (5th Cir. 1996), rev’d on other
grounds, 520 U.S. 833 (1997) (“The use of a community property system represents
Louisiana’s recognition of the value a spouse, though non-employed, contributes to
a marriage.”). “Rather than viewing a married couple as distinct individuals
acquiring property for their own benefit, the community property system
acknowledges a married couple as an economic unit. . . . [A]ll income earned by
either spouse or property purchased with those earnings is marital property.”
Deborah H. Bell, Family Law at the Turn of the Century, 71 MISS. L.J. 781, 791
(2002).
171. The number of community property states has not expanded in the fashion
it appeared to be heading at the time joint filing with income splitting was
introduced in 1948. There are now nine community property states—Arizona,
California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, Washington, and
Wisconsin—and one state, Alaska, which offers an optional community property
regime. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-211(A) (2017); CAL. FAM. CODE § 751
(West 2017); IDAHO CODE § 32-906(1) (2017); LA. CIV. CODE art. 2336 (2017);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.225(1) (2017); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-12 (2017); TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.002 (2017); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030 (2017); WIS.
STAT. § 766.31(3) (2017); ALASKA STAT. § 34.77.020 (2017). Alaska’s optional
community property system would not be recognized for federal income tax
reporting purposes. See Comm’r v. Harmon, 323 U.S. 44, 45–46 (1944) (not
recognizing for federal income tax purposes a similar Oklahoma statute allowing
spouses to elect a community property system).
172. Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11001(a).
173. Additional allocations for dependents may be provided through the Child
Tax Credit, § 24, the EITC, § 32, and others. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 24, 32 (2012).
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legislative change in 2017, Congress recognized that the non-earner,
usually the wife, should be given demonstrable value in the family through
the code. This permissive joint filing proposal extends that value
recognition to all spouses, asserting that the marriage bonus is the result
of a just application of income tax to earnings that each spouse has
contributed to its acquisition through his own industry as determined by
the family as a unit. The potential of tax benefits accruing to a married
couple over an unmarried couple from a non-earning spouse are beneficial
to the concept of the family as a unit and are necessary for the recognition
of the non-earning spouse as an individual and a taxpayer as apart from a
dependent of a taxpayer. Addressing equity concerns must be paramount
in the design of a contemporary tax code despite the negative comparative
distributive effects perceived in the current code.
C. Permissive Joint Filing is American
An income tax system has a primary objective of raising monies to
operate the government, which may provide for services at a range of
degrees.174 That degree may evolve over time and in response to economic,
social, and political changes experienced by the citizenry. The
organization of whom, what, and how much to tax in the United States is
derived from various principles: horizontal equity, or taxing those with
like incomes and circumstances similarly; vertical equity, or taxing those
with greater means at higher percentages; economic efficiency and growth;
and redistribution.175 The hierarchy of these principles has varied in each
principle’s rank in response to historical circumstances and economic
success or struggle, with the primacy of vertical equity in the 1940s and
1950s giving way to valuing economic efficiency as the nation approached
the turn of the century.176
If a family for purposes of the “family penalty” is composed of a
married couple with at least one dependent, then the family penalty began
no later than in 1951 with the addition of the HOH filing status. Before
174. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Three Goals of Taxation, 60 TAX. L. REV. 1, 3
(2006).
175. Elkins, supra note 8.
176. Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Equity Versus Efficiency and the U.S. Tax System
in Historical Perspective, in TAX JUSTICE: THE ONGOING DEBATE 25, 25–49
(Joseph J. Thorndike & Dennis J. Ventry, Jr. eds., 2002). In this chapter, Ventry
traces the post-World War II era decline in tax reform focused on vertical equity’s
effects on social and economic justice in favor of a movement toward considering
deviations from horizontal equity and its effect on efficiency and economic
growth. Id.
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this change, the original taxpayer as the individual shifted to universal
married income splitting in 1948.177 Though it seems that the 1948 change
was a horizontal, equity-based response to the ability of those in some
community property states to report half of the community income as
individuals, Congress similarly could have resolved the problem by
mandating that community property laws were not applied for purposes of
calculating federal income tax.178 Congress’s election to provide for income
splitting allowed for equality among the spouses because all income earned
by the married couple was treated as income earned half by each spouse.179
This treatment of a couple’s joint income as belonging to both equally
at a time when the bulk of the income was exclusively earned and managed
by the husband was an important step forward for women, indicating the
independence and contribution to the household of the wife and mother in
1948.180 Though this progressive and feministic reflection on property and
income rights was an indirect result of the passage of similarly intended
community property regimes in only a few states, the individual assessment
of the wife and the mother was a forward-thinking application of the revenue
system, which is a very real device for measuring national values.181

177. See discussion supra Part I.B.
178. Such a “legislative fix” would be necessary under a permissive joint filing
regime to dodge the rush of states to a community property regime in order to
benefit from precisely the conflict between common law and community property
law states that arose pre-1948. See supra note 36.
179. Poe v. Seaborn explained the community property law that the Court was
addressing in that “the wife has, in Washington, a vested property right in the
community property, equal with that of her husband; and in the income of the
community, including salaries or wages of either husband or wife, of both.” Poe
v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 111 (1930).
180. H.R. REP. NO. 80-1274, at 24 (1948), predicted the “flood of ill-advised
State legislation” enacting community property regimes that would result if income
splitting was not permitted nationally, demonstrating that States were ready to
extend these community property rights regimes that would have provided directly
for such property rights to women. That they moved instead to enact equal access
of married couples to income splitting through the tax code should not be viewed as
an indication of a nation of States that were not ready to extend such rights through
such state regimes but that the rash implementation of these complicated schemes
had led to, and would lead to greater, complications that could be avoided with the
1948 code reforms that were established. Id.
181. The assertion that the wife and mother is the second or lesser earner in a
family is both generally understood and statistically proven. See U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, MARITAL STATUS—PEOPLE 18 YEARS
OLD AND OVER BY MEDIAN INCOME AND SEX, ALL RACES tbl. P-13 (2016). This
1974 data reports a median income of $3,260 for married women with income and
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The 1951 addition of the HOH filing status assuredly reflected a shift in
the national understanding of individual responsibilities and the taxpayer’s
obligation to support those responsibilities for unmarried individuals
burdened with a dependent, but what of the addition of the HOH status’s
symbolic nature to the wife and the mother? There are certainly expenses for
the HOH filer over and above the Unmarried filer, though tax brackets had
never before represented dependents, who instead were accounted for through
deductions and credits.182 The 1951 change essentially counted a dependent
child as half a spouse as represented by the width of a tax bracket while
reducing the mother by that same half as symbolized by her added value
to the family when considering income tax rates on taxable income. Where
greater income generally was earned by the father of this unit, the income
splitting initiated by Seaborn in 1930 and extended nationally through the
1948 reforms reflected an equity in ownership of the family purse for the
wife and mother.183 The changes in 1951 and 1969, then, though purportedly
attempting to extend a measure of horizontal equity to single persons with
varied responsibilities, must have represented a reverse of shift in ownership
of income to he who earned it.
The more direct penalization of the married family occurred in 1969.
When Congress repositioned the Unmarrieds’ liabilities to no greater than
20% of the married income tax liability while freezing the liabilities of
those married but filing separately at the former singles rates, it also meant
that Congress shifted that former “singles penalty” to a similar marriage
penalty that could apply to penalize the traditional family.184 Now, the
penalty extended to wedded couples without children, further reducing the
value of the wife.

a median income of $10,683 for married men with income. Men are reported to
have a median income 3.28 times that of working spouses. When the spouse is
present, nearly 47.5 million of those men had income in that year while only
nearly 30 million married women had income. 1.58 times as many men had their
own income as compared to married women. The differential in median income
since 1974, though mostly steadily declining, reached a low of men having a
median income of 1.78 times that of women with earnings in 2009 and 1.07 times
as many men with their own income as married women, when the spouse was
present, in 1994. (Data is provided through 2015.) Id.
182. See, e.g., Personal Exemption, I.R.C. § 151 (2012), EITC, id. § 32, and
Child Tax Credit, id. § 24.
183. United States Census Bureau data beginning in 1974 demonstrates the
common understanding that men earned more than women both then and now and
that, in a marriage where both spouses are present, more women than men do not
have earned income. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 181.
184. See Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 803, 83 Stat. 487, 681–82.
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Notably, the summary of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 passed by the
House of Representatives, which allowed certain dependent-less single
people access to more generous HOH filing brackets, remarked that a
provision reducing tax liability for singles is adverse to marriage because
two individuals eligible for this lower liability may be responsible for a
higher combined liability as a result of marriage.185 The Joint Committee’s
summary continued by stating its perception that “there is some question
whether marriage is significantly affected by such tax considerations.”186
That question, which was dismissed in 1969, may not be dismissed so
easily today.
More recently, the 1981 Congress’s secondary earner deduction purported
to respond to concerns about the marriage tax penalty while retaining taxation
on married couples jointly.187 The focus during this reform was on the high
effective marginal tax rate on the second earner’s income in a joint filing and
its adverse effect on a second earner’s decision to work.188 The secondary
earner deduction allowed for a deduction of ten percent on up to $30,000 of
income earned by the spouse with lower earnings on a joint return.189 Though
this feeble attempt at addressing rampant penalties for the laboring wife was
a short-lived code inclusion, its meager and indirect offering is an
unsatisfactory path to creating the achievable equality and fairness that is
proposed by this Article in the form of a new code structure.190 Though the
2017 tax reform has made great strides toward reducing the marriage and
family penalty, Permissive Joint Filing allows for full respect of the
secondary earner’s income as income earned by an individual; that
earner’s income is entitled to its own, separate, progressive taxation.
Several tax provisions relating to taxation of the family provide varied tax
benefits to two individuals on the basis of whether they are legally married.
Many of these tax provisions operate to allow varied treatment based on
marital status to allow for administration of the code while others assume the

185. SUMMARY OF H.R. 13270, THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, supra note 56,
at 104.
186. Id.
187. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, 97TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF
THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981, at 33–37 (1981).
188. Id. at 34.
189. Economic Tax Recovery Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 103, 95 Stat.
172, 187, added § 221 of the Internal Revenue Code that provided for “Deduction
for Two-Earner Married Couples.” For tax years beginning in 1982, the applicable
percentage was five percent. Id.
190. Introducing secondary earner incentives while retaining joint filing will
never achieve marriage neutrality. See, e.g., Listokin, supra note 31, at 201–02.
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result of horizontal equity based on an economies of scale premise.191 A third
category of detrimental provisions that prey asymmetrically on these wedded
procreators are meant simply to punish earned income generally, despite
falling disproportionately on the value of maternal compensation to the family
purse.192
Proposals to alleviate such results include making child care costs a
deductible business expense, increasing the child care credit, and increasing
and expanding the dependent care assistance programs. Allowing for child
care costs expended to engage in employment to function as a deductible
expense preserves America’s strong held value of a parent’s right to direct
the upbringing of his child.193 Limiting the value of such a deduction to
either the earned income of the lower earning spouse, as the child care credit
provides, or to tack on a modest two-percent floor by classifying the
deduction as a miscellaneous itemized deduction layers a value of arguable
economic efficiency to such a tax expenditure.
Congress has revised the EITC’s potentially severe family penalty for
very low income families since its 1975 enactment. The addition of a
separate phase-out threshold for married families introduced through the
2001 legislation and effective in 2002, attempted to reduce the marriage
penalty by increasing the phase-out threshold and completed phase-out
191. For instance, the Mortgage Interest Deduction, I.R.C. § 163(h)(3), allows
for a deduction of mortgage interest on up to two homes per taxpayer either as an
individual if unmarried, or as a couple if married. The implication is that either
such unit of taxpayer is afforded two homes, discounting the situation in which
married taxpayers may keep separate households for purposes of careers. Also
consider the uniform $10,000 limitation, applicable to married and unmarried,
alike, on deducting state and local taxes. Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11042(a) (to be
codified at I.R.C. § 163).
192. Thresholds for tax surcharges like the Medicare surtax, id. § 1411, are
applied to unmarried individuals at significantly more than half the threshold
applied to a married couple. For instance, the tax is imposed on the excess net
investment income of an unmarried individual on income over a $200,000
threshold but on the excess net investment income of an unmarried individual on
income over a $250,000 threshold. § 1411(b).
193. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (“The liberty interest at
issue in this case—the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their
children—is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by
this Court.” (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 401 (1923); Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978);
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753
(1982))).
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income amounts by a mere $1,000.194 That amount in 2016 allows for a
$5,520 differential, the difference between $18,110 and $23,630, permitting
that a married couple faces a penalty with regard to receiving the full credit
amount once adjusted gross income exceeds $23,630, but that an unmarried
couple of equivalent income could potentially avoid a penalty with $36,220
of that same type of income.195
CONCLUSION
In 1948, Congress amended the basis for collecting income tax on two
married individuals in a way that respected each individual’s contributions
to the collective earnings.196 It did so by recognizing marriage as a strong
basis for determining household income while honoring each spouse’s role
in the creation of that pecuniary wealth.197 Subsequent Congressional
revisions to American tax law have led it away from reflecting the value
America places on family and on the individual.
The 2017 tax reform provided for important revisions to the code, which
reduced marriage and family penalties. The next important code revision
must be to eliminate such penalties while preserving bonuses that support
and value families by allowing permissive joint filing. Permissive joint
filing is the right solution for a contemporary society.

194. See Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub.
L. No. 107-16, § 303, 115 Stat. 38, 55.
195. Note also that the second element of Earned Income Credit eligibility is
a limit on investment income that is not increased for a married couple over an
unmarried couple but would be allowed for each taxpayer in an unmarried couple.
For 2016, the excessive investment income limit is $3,400. Rev. Proc. 2015-53, §
3.06, 2015-44 I.R.B. 615.
196. Though the Revenue Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16, § 2, 38 Stat. 114,
166, was the first to impose an income tax following the ratification of the
Sixteenth Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XVI, and the Revenue Act of 1918,
Pub. L. No. 65-254, § 223, 40 Stat. 1057, 1074, first provided for calculating
income tax liability jointly; the Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-471, § 301,
62 Stat. 110, 114, first allowed effective income splitting for married persons
filing jointly—giving them twice the tax bracket allowance allowed to an
unmarried person. The joint return election currently is found in I.R.C. § 6013.
197. See Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-471, § 301, 62 Stat. 110, 114
(1948); see also discussion supra Part I.B.

